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INTRODUCTION
Appellants, through counsel, respectfully submit the following Brief of the
Appellants, pursuant to Rules 24, 26 and 27 of the

UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE

PROCEDURE.

JURISDICTION
This appeal is taken from a final order of the Fourth Judicial District Court,
Utah County, State of Utah, granting Defendant City of Pleasant Grove's Motion
for Summary Judgment. The Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction over this
matter pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)0) i2^2

&

Supp. 2005)

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
ISSUE #1:

Did the trial court err in granting a Motion for Summary

Judgment, pursuant to the Governmental Immunity Act's Immunity for a "natural
condition," by finding that a "sudden gust of wind" was the cause of Daniel
Grappendorf s injuries and death, even though the negligent storage of the artificial
pitcher's mound in a vertical position against a chain-link fence, contrary to the
manufacturer's instructions, preceded the gust and combined with the gust, and
even though the wind would not have created a danger but for the negligent storage
of the mound?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

When reviewing whether the trial court

properly granted summary judgment, the appellate court accords no deference to

the trial court's legal conclusions and reviews those conclusions for correctness.
Furthermore, a trial court's interpretations and application of a statute is a question
of law that is reviewed for correctness. Blackner v. State Dept. of Trans. 2002 UT
44, U 8, 48 P.3d 949.
SUPPORTING AUTHORITY:
seq.) (2002); U T A H R .

CIV.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 63-30-2, et.

P. 56(c) (2006); Blackner v. State Dept. of Trans. 2002

UT 44, 48 P.3d 949; Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568 (Utah 1996).
CITATION TO THE RECORD:

This Issue was preserved in the

trial court at R. 0495-0518, and Oral Argument at R. 1150
ISSUE #2:

Did the Governmental Immunity Act, as applied to the

Grappendorfs, violate the Open Courts Clause of the Utah Constitution?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Constitutional issues are questions of law
that are reviewed for correctness. Chen v. Stuart, 2004 UT 82 %25, 100 P.3d 1177;
see also Tindley v. Salt Lake City School DisL, 2005 UT 30, f 11, 116 P.3d 295
(whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law which is reviewed for
correctness). The propriety of a trial court's grant of summary judgment is a
question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Blackner v. State Dept. of Trans.
2002UT44,p,48P.3d949.
SUPPORTING AUTHORITY:
(1896) (a.k.a. Utah's Open Court's Clause);

UTAH
UTAH

R.

CIV.

CONST,

art. I, § 11

P. 56(c) (2006); Berry

ex rel Berry v. Beechcraft Aircraft Corp., Ill

P.2d 670 (Utah 1985); Laney v.

Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, 57 P.3d 1007; Wood v. University of Utah Medical
Center, 2002 UT 134, 67 P.3d 436; Tindley v. Salt Lake City School District, 2005
UT 30, 116 P.3d 295; Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, (Utah
1980).
CITATION TO THE RECORD:

This Issue was preserved in the

trial court at R. 0881 -0892, and at Oral Argument 1150.
ISSUE #3:

Did the Governmental Immunity Act, as applied, violate

the right to recover damages for injuries resulting in death of the Utah State
Constitution?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Constitutional issues are questions of law
that are reviewed for correctness. Chen v. Stuart, 2004 UT 82 f 25, 100 P.3d 1177;
see also Tindley v. Salt Lake City School Dist., 2005 UT 30, 1 11, 116 P.3d 295
(whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law which is reviewed for
correctness). The propriety of a trial court's grant of summary judgment is a
question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Blackner v. State Dept. of Trans.
2002UT44,p,48P.3d949.
SUPPORTING AUTHORITY:
UTAHR. CIV.

UTAH CONST,

art. XVI, §5(1896);

P. 56(c) (2006); Comp. Laws 1876, §§ 1216, 1217 (Utah 1876) and

2 Comp. Laws 1888, §§ 2961, 2962, 3179 (Utah 1888) ("Lord Campbell's Act");

Mason v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 24 P. 796 (Utah 1890); Tucker v. Salt Lake City, 37
P. 261 (Utah 1894); Thomas v. Springville City, 35 P. 503 (Utah 1894); Hopkins v
Ogden City, 16 p. 596 (Utah 1888); Levy v. Salt Lake City, 16 P. 598 (Utah 1887);
Lowe v. Salt Lake City, 44 P. 1050 (Utah 1896); Dwyer v. Salt Lake City, 57 P. 535
(Utah 1899); Berry ex rel Berry v. Beechcraft Aircraft Corp., Ill P.2d 670 (Utah
1985); Tiede v. State of Utah, 915P.2d500, (Utah 1996); Parks v. Utah Transit
Authority, 2002 UT 55, 53 P.3d 473; Tindley v. Salt Lake City School District,
2005 UT 30, 116 P.3d 295; Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, 57 P.3d 1007;
Standifordv. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, (Utah 1980).
CITATION TO THE RECORD:

This Issue was preserved in the

trial court at R. 0881-0892, and at Oral Argument 1150.
ISSUE #4:

Did the Governmental Immunity Act, as applied, violate

Grappendorf s Petition Rights under Utah State Constitution?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Constitutional issues are questions of law
that are reviewed for correctness. Chen v. Stuart, 2004 UT 82 \ 25, 100 P.3d 1177;
see also Tindley v. Salt Lake City School Dist, 2005 UT 30, f 11, 116 P.3d 295
(whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law which is revieAved for
correctness). The propriety of a trial court's grant of summary judgment is a
question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Blackner v. State Dept. of Trans.
2002 UT 44,18, 48 P.3d 949.

SUPPORTING AUTHORITY:
UTAH

R.

CIV.

UTAH CONST,

art. I, § 1 (1896);

P. 56(c) (2006); Kish v. Wright, 562 P.2d 625, (Utah 1977,); In re

Anderson, 2004 UT 7,168, 82 P.3d 1134.
CITATION TO THE RECORD:

This Issue was preserved in the

trial court at R. 0881 -0892, and at Oral Argument 1150.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES
ADDENDUM 1:

UTAH CONST,

art. I, § 1 (1896);

ADDENDUM 2:

UTAH CONST,

art. I, § 11(1896);

ADDENDUM 3:

UTAH CONST

art. XVI, § 5 (1896, Rev. 1919);

ADDENDUM 4:

UTAH R. CIV.

P. 56 (2006);

ADDENDUM 5:

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 63-30-2(2002);

ADDENDUM 6:

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 63-30-3(2002);

ADDENDUM 7:

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 63-30-10(2002);

ADDENDUM 8: "Lord Campbell's Act" Comp. Laws 1876, §§ 1216, 1217
(Utah 1876); 2 Comp. Laws 1888, §§2961, 2962, 3179, (Utah
1888);
ADDENDUM 9: Memorandum Decision;
ADDENDUM 10: Supplemental Memorandum Decision;
ADDENDUM 11: Order.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE:

On June 21, 2002, thirteen-year-old

Daniel Austen Grappendorf went to watch his sister play softball at the Discovery
Park Baseball Diamonds, which are owned and operated by the Appellee, City of
Pleasant Grove. ("Pleasant Grove").

Pleasant Grove also owned a 400+ pound,

twelve foot by eight foot, portable pitching mound that was made of plywood and
covered with artificial turf.
Pleasant Grove improperly and negligently stored this pitching mound by
standing it on its edge against a chain link fence, contrary to the manufacturer's
express written instructions, which required the mound to be placed flat on the
ground or flush against a wall, in order to prevent the wind from lifting the mound.
As anticipated by the manufacturer, a gust of wind did pick up the pitching mound
and caused it to sail like a Frisbee, striking, and crushing Daniel Grappendorf s
skull, killing him instantly.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS:

On September 18, 2003, Daniel

and Heidi Grappendorf, and Phil and Jenny Thompson, (collectively "the
Grappendorfs") petitioned for redress of their grievances by commencing a
wrongful death action in the Fourth District Court against Pleasant Grove and
American Sports International, Ltd. a.k.a. American Athletics, Inc., an Iowa

Corporation, Becwill Corp., dba Proper Pitch, a North Carolina Corp., Proper
Pitch, and Does I-X.
On February 28, 2005, the trial court heard oral argument on four pending
motions: (1) Pleasant Grove's Motion for Summary Judgment filed on October 21,
2004; (2) the Grappendorfs' Motion to Continue the Summary Judgment Motion
pursuant to Rule 56(f), Utah R. Civ. P.; (3) the Grappendorfs' Motion to Amend
their Opposition to Pleasant Grove's Summary Judgment Motion; and (4) Pleasant
Grove's Motion to Strike the Grappendorfs' Motion to Amend their Opposition.
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT:

On March 29, 2005, the

trial court issued its Memorandum Decision granting Pleasant Grove City's Motion
for Summary Judgment on the grounds that the defendant city, as a governmental
entity, was immune from suit pursuant to Utah's Governmental Immunity Act,
concluding that the cause of Daniel Grappendorfs death was a "natural condition"
pursuant to

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 63-30-10(11)(2002), therefore, the case fell within

that exception to the state's waiver of immunity.
The trial court ruled that the second motion (Rule 56(f) motion) was moot
because the court found that there were no issues of material fact which discovery
could resolve. The third motion (motion to amend the original opposition) filed by
the Grappendorfs

argued that the Governmental Immunity

Statute was

unconstitutional under the Utah Constitution. The fourth motion (motion to strike)

filed by Pleasant Grove addressed the constitutional issues raised in the motion to
amend. The trial court granted the motion to amend, but did not allow full briefing
of either the motion to amend or the motion to strike. The trial court treated the
third motion, the motion to amend, and the fourth motion, the motion to strike, as
supplemental oppositions and supplemental reply memorandum to Pleasant
Grove's motion for summary judgment. Having treated both the third and fourth
motions as motions to amend, the court felt no need to have full briefing.
On April 6, 2005, Grappendorfs filed an objection to Pleasant Grove's
proposed order on the March 29, 2005 memorandum decision. On May 19, 2005,
the trial court issued a Supplemental Memorandum Decision. On December 22,
2005, Defendant Becwill was dismissed with prejudice. On January 23, 2006 the
only remaining defendant, American Athletics was dismissed with prejudice after
the parties settled that claim. On January 30, 2006, Grappendorfs sought Rule
54(b) certification of the summary judgment order in favor of Pleasant Grove. On
April 19, 2006 the judgment was certified under Rule 54(b)

UTAH

R.

CIV.

P.

(2006). This appeal ensued.
FACTUAL STATEMENT
1.

Appellee-Pleasant Grove is a city in Utah, which owns and operates a

recreational venue called "Discovery Park Baseball Diamonds" or "Manila Field."
(Record on Appeal {hereinafter "R."), at 1053).

2.

To accommodate baseball and softball game play, Pleasant Grove

purchased and used a 400-pound moveable pitching mound made of plywood and
covered with artificial turf. (R. at 1053, 349-352, and 379).
3.

To store the pitching mound when it was not in use, a Pleasant Grove

employee stood the pitching mound on its side and chained the mound to a chainlink-fence, contrary to the manufacturer's express, written safety instructions,
which required the pitching mound to be stored flat on the floor or "flush against a
wall." (R. at 1053, 0445-0461, and 0388).
4.

The pitching mound was chained to the fence using a nylon strap that

was intended by the manufacturer to be used only for the purpose of moving the
pitching mound to and from the field, and not to secure the pitching mound to a
fence. (R. at 0337-0343, 0388, 0513, and 0428-0429).
5.

The nylon strap was connected to the top edge of the pitching mound

by four one-inch screws. (R. at 0337-0343).
6.

On June 21, 2002, thirteen-year-old Daniel Grappendorf went to

watch his sister, Mallorie, play softball at Manila Field. (R. at 258, 512).
7.

At approximately 7:55 p.m., a summer wind gust lifted the mound up

and pulled it away from the chain-link fence, causing it to sail like a 400-pound
Frisbee. (R. at 1053, 0370, 0357, 0354, 0513, 0337-0343, 0511).

8.

The pitching mound struck and decapitated Daniel Grappendorf,

killing him instantaneously. (R. at 1053, 0511, 0257)
9.

The trial court granted Pleasant Grove's Motion for Summary

Judgment, finding that the gust of wind was the cause of Daniel Grappendorf s
death, thereby finding the case to fall within the "natural condition" exception to
the Governmental Immunity Act, and finding that the Act was constitutional
despite Article I § 11 (Open Courts Clause) and Article XVI § 5 (Wrongful Death
Guarantee) of the Utah Constitution. (R. at 1036-1053).
10.

On February 28, 2005, the trial court heard arguments regarding

Article I § 1, (Petition Clause) of the Utah Constitution but did not address the
issue in the memorandum decision. (R. at 1036-1053, Oral Argument Hr'g. Tr.
13:8-11,29:20-25).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court misapplied and misinterpreted the "natural condition"
exception to the Governmental Immunity Act as defined by Blackner v. State Dept.
of Trans.

2002 UT 44, 48 P.3d 949.

As applied by the trial court, the

Governmental Immunity Act violates the Utah Constitution—Article I § 11 (the
Open Courts Clause); Article XVI § 5 (the Wrongful Death Cause of Action
Guarantee); and Article I § 1 (the Petition Clause). In addition, by expanding the
definition of "government function" to include the operation of a baseball field, the

trial court effectively abrogated any remedies against the government, in violation
of Article I § 11 (the Open Courts Clause), Article XVI § 5 (the Wrongful Death
Cause of Action Guarantee), and Article I § 1 (the Petition Clause).
ARGUMENT
I.

THERE SHOULD BE NO IMMUNITY WHEN A NEGLIGENT
GOVERNMENTAL ACT PRECEDES A NATURAL CONDITION
AND CREATES A DANGER.
Relying on Blackner v. Dept. of Transportation, 2002 UT 44, 48 P.3d 949,

the trial court held that a gust of wind was the cause of Daniel Grappendorf s
death, therefore, the "natural condition" exception to the waiver of immunity
provided in the Governmental Immunity Act conferred immunity on the City of
Pleasant Grove.

In so doing, the trial court misinterpreted and/or misapplied

Blackner.
In pertinent part, the Governmental Immunity Act provides:
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for
injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an
employee committed within the scope of his employment, except
if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from:
(11) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands,
UTAHCODEANN.

1

63-30-10(11X1997)1.

Effective July 1, 2004 the Governmental Immunity Act was reenacted as
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30d-101 et seq. holding injuries alleged to be caused by a
governmental entity prior to July 1, 2004 to be governed by the Provisions of 63,
Chapter 30. Thus Title 63, Chapter 30 is cited to in this memorandum. Therefore,

In Blackner, this Court found that, "but for" a prior natural condition, a
government employee would not have been negligent, therefore, the natural
condition was the cause of the plaintiffs injuries. Id. at f 15. Thus, in Blackner the
"natural condition" preceded the governmental negligence and was the cause of the
plaintiffs injury. That is not the instant case.
Specifically, in Blackner, a police officer stopped vehicular traffic that was
en route up Little Cottonwood Canyon because an avalanche blocked the road
ahead. The officer negligently stopped vehicles in a known slide area. Id. at ff 45. While waiting for the avalanche to be cleared a second avalanche cascaded
down the mountainside and injured Mr. Blackner. Id. at f 6.
On those facts, this Court held that, "but for the snow pack and the first
avalanche, Mr. Blackner would not have suffered injury." Id. at f 15. u[W]ere it
not for the first avalanche, [the police officer] would not have stopped Blackner
and others from proceeding up the canyon." Id. Thus, in Blackner, the natural
condition (the snowpack and the first avalanche) created the danger. In Blackner,
therefore, the natural condition—and not the government employee—was the
cause of the plaintiffs injuries.

as at the trial court, this Brief will look to the statute as it existed prior to July 1,
2004.

Unlike Blackner, in the instant case, the governmental negligencedisregarding express written manufacturer's instructions and placing an artificial
pitching mound in a position that was contrary to the safe procedure required by
the manufacturer—created the danger. Here, in contradistinction to Blackner, the
governmental negligence preceded the natural condition. Here, in contradistinction
to Blackner, but for the negligent governmental act, the natural condition would
not have caused the pitching mound to become airborne nor would the pitching
mound have caused Daniel Grappendorf s death.
Simple examples demonstrate the error in the trial court's application of
Blackner to the instant case. Under the trial court's analysis, if the City of Pleasant
Grove had suspended the pitching mound above the bleachers with kite string and
the kite string broke, allowing a 400-pound object to fall on and crush dozens of
fans, the city would be immune from suit—because gravity was a natural condition
that caused the mound to fall. After all, but for gravity—a natural condition—the
mound would not have fallen.
Likewise, if a governmental entity renovated a state capitol building with
walls and joists and roofs and floors that were substandard and below known
engineering requirements published in applicable building codes, and the building
collapsed in predictable wind conditions, killing scores of citizens—under the trial
court's analysis in the instant case—the governmental entity would be immune

from suit because hot air, and not substandard engineering, was a natural condition
that caused the capitol to collapse.
Such cannot have been the intended result of the legislature in providing a
"natural condition" exception to the waiver of governmental immunity. Surely, in
adopting a "natural condition" exception, the legislature was aware of the lesson of
the Three Little Pigs: A gust of wind took down a house built of straw; a gust of
wind took down a house built of sticks; but a gust of wind could not take down a
house properly built from bricks.
II.

THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT,
VIOLATES THE OPEN COURTS CLAUSE.

AS

APPLIED,

The Utah State Constitution provides:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to
him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by
due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party.
UTAH CONST,

art. I, § 11. This provision, known as the "Open Courts Clause,55

guarantees parties an access to a judicial forum in which their petitions for redress
may be heard.

The Utah Supreme Court has adopted a two-pronged test to

determine whether legislation runs afoul of the Open Courts Clause. See Berry ex
rel Berry v. Beechcraft Aircraft Corp., Ill P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985).

Under the Berry test, a law that abrogates a common law remedy or cause of
action is constitutional only if it meets one of two requirements: 1) the law
abrogating the remedy also provides an injured person an effective and reasonable
alternative remedy; or 2) there is a clear social or economic evil to be eliminated,
and the elimination of the existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable
means for achieving the objective. Id; see also Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT
79, ff 49-55; 57 P.3d 1007, 1021-1023 (finding the Governmental Immunity Act
violated the Open Courts Clause when the Appellant right to sue the government
for a proprietary function was abrogated)
Grappendorfs argued below that the application of the Governmental
Immunity Act abrogated their claims against the governmental defendants.2 In
general, Utah courts have recognized negligence actions against governmental
entities since prior to statehood. See Levy v. Salt Lake City, 1 P. 160, 162 (Utah
1881). The trial court abrogated the Grappendorfs claims in two respects.
First, exDandins the definition of natural conditions to include the
circumstances of the instant case has, in essence, abrogated any cause of action that
results in physical injury against a governmental entity. See Blackner v. State

2

More specifically, the 1987 amendments to the Governmental Immunity
Act, which included the laundry list of exceptions to the original 1965 Act's
waiver, abrogated Appellants' claims. See generally UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-1 et
seq. (1953 as amended 1966); cf. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-10 et seq. (1986 &
Supp. 1989).

Dept of Tramp., 2002 UT 44, 48 P.3d 949. Injury does not occur in the absence
of some natural condition, such as gravity, friction, or wind, etc. Second, Utah
recognized a cause of action arising from the negligent operation of a golf course
mStandifordv.

Salt Lake City, 605 P.2d 1230, 1237 (Utah, 1980)—essentially the

same cause of action as the Grappendorfs asserted below.
Moreover, the Governmental Immunity Act provides no alternative remedy
for the Grappendorfs in this case.

Under the trial court's application of the

Governmental Immunity Act, the Grappendorfs' claims are simply foreclosed, and
they are suffered to bear the costs of Pleasant Grove's negligence. And the act
itself states no "clear social or economic evil" to be eliminated by closing the doors
of the courts on injured parties, such as the Grappendorfs.
The trial court interprets Blackner in a manner that contravenes the Open
Courts clause. The trial court found "but for the sudden gust of wind, the injury
would not have arose"~whereas the correct interpretation would be that, but for the
obviously negligent placement of the pitching mound by Pleasant Grove
employees, contrary to the specific directions given to Pleasant Grove employees,
the gust of wind would have caused no injury. Clearly, the trial court's misuse of
the Blackner "but for" test abrogates any negligence claims and the Grappendorfs'
rights under the Open Courts Clause of the Utah Constitution under the test created
in Berry is violated.

Second, the operation of a baseball park, like a golf course in Standiford, is
proprietary and as such is not entitled to immunity and therefore, applying the
Governmental Immunity Act is unconstitutional. In Laney, this Court determined
that it was an abrogation of rights, which provided no alternative remedy nor
eliminated any clear or social economic evil; therefore, pursuant to the Berry test,
it was unconstitutional to expand the definition of "government function" to
include proprietary functions such as a recreational facility. 2002 UT 79, ff 53-55.
In Laney the concurring opinion of Justices Howe and Russon recognizes
that "[i]f government chooses to engage in proprietary activities, it must do so on
the same basis as private persons. It has been long established that government,
when performing proprietary functions, is liable for its actions." Id. at | 77.
In Laney, the Supreme Court found U.C.A. 63-30-2(4)(a), the same section
interpreted by the trial court to grant immunity to Pleasant Grove, to be
unconstitutional as applied:
"Governmental function" means any act, failure to act, operation,
function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or not
the act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking is
characterized as governmental, proprietary, a core governmental
function, unique to government, undertaken in a dual capacity,
essential to or not essential to a government or governmental
function, or could be performed by private enterprise of private
persons, {emphasis added).
UTAH CODE ANN.

63-30-2(4)(a).

In Standiford, this Court held that the negligent operation of a golf course is
not protected by the Governmental Immunity Act, because it is a proprietary
activity.

Id. at 1236-1237.

Thus, any interpretation of the Governmental

Immunity Act that abrogates a cause of action for proprietary functions of a
governmental agency, would be considered unconstitutional under the open courts
clause test of Berry. Because the operation of a ballpark is proprietary, under
Berry} an amendment to the Act that abrogates the Grappendorfs' cause of action is
an unconstitutional violation of the Open Courts clause.
III.

AS APPLIED, THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY IMPAIRS THE WRONGFUL DEATH
CAUSE OF ACTION GUARANTEE.
The Governmental Immunity Act, as applied to the Grappendorfs' claims for

the wrongful death of their child, violated their constitutional right to assert a
wrongful death claim.
The Utah State Constitution provides:
The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in death,
shall never be abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall not be
subject to any statutory limitation, except in cases where
compensation for injuries resulting in death is provided for by law.
UTAH STATE CONST.,

art. XVI, § 5 (1896).

This Court has held that, where the Constitution clearly prohibits the
Legislature form abrogating a "right to action," it is necessary to determine what

the right was and who enjoyed it—at the time the Constitution was adopted. Tiede
v. State of Utah, 915 P.2d 500, 503 (Utah 1986).
The Court erred in Tiede in concluding that the government was immune
from suit for wrongful death at the time the Utah Constitution was adopted. In
fact, actions for wrongful death were recognized prior to the adoption of the Utah
Constitution. Accordingly, the legislature did, in fact, abrogate an existing right of
action when it enacted the Governmental Immunity Act, in violation of Article
XVI, § 5 of the Utah Constitution. Id. at 504.
The Supreme Court of Utah will overturn precedent if convinced it is clear
that the rule was originally erroneous. Laney, 2002 UT 79, 45. It should do so in
the instant case.
This Court may not have been provided with accurate historical information
when Tiede was decided and the Court held that no cause of action existed for
wrongful death against the state or its subdivisions when Utah adopted its
constitution, 915 P,2d at 504, Instead, the Court relied on a procedural statute that
was enacted in 1896 in concluding that a claim for wrongful death did not exist at
the time of the adoption of the constitution. (See 1898 Revised Statutes of Utah §
929) . Id. According to Tiede, the Act on which this Court based its determination

This Act gave the Power to "[t]he governor, the secretary of state, and the
attorney general constitute a board of examiners, with power to examine all claims
against the State."

that there was no cause of action for wrongful death was enacted a year after the
constitution was adopted. Id.
In fact, as early as 1874 and through 1898, Utah had in effect a wrongful
death statute, known as "An Act providing damages for death caused by wrongful
act, negligent or default."4 That statute provided:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act,
neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as
would, if the death had not ensued, have entitled the party
injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect
thereof, then, and in every such case, the person who, or the
company or corporation which would have been liable if death
had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages,
notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the
death shall have been caused under such circumstances as
amount to law to felony, {emphasis added).
Comp. Laws Territory of Utah 1874; 2 Comp.1888 § 2961; See Mason v. Union
Pac. Ry. Co. 24 P. 796 (Utah 1890) (finding that Utah's wrongful death statute
created a new cause of action in the heirs to pursue a claim of negligence on behalf
of the deceased if the negligence caused his death). Unlike the procedural statute,
1898 Revised Statutes of Utah § 929, this statute was in effect at the time of the
adoption of the Utah Constitution.
Historically, common law gave a person injured without fault a right to
recover from the person or corporation whose negligence or wrongful act produced

4

Also known as "Lord Campbell Act."

injury, and, if death ensued from such negligence or wrongful act, the statute gives
his heirs a right of action to recover compensation from the same person or
corporation for the injury in consequence of his death. Id. at 797. If a cause of
action existed for negligent acts against a governmental entity such as a municipal
corporation at the adoption of the Utah Constitution, then, with this statute, a cause
of action existed at the time the constitution was adopted against the municipal
corporation for wrongful death.
Accordingly, any statute that abrogates this right, as does the governmental
immunity act in this instance, is unconstitutional pursuant to Article XVI § 5 of the
Utah Constitution. With the enactment of "Lord Campbell's Act, the question
turns from was there a cause of action against a governmental entity for wrongful
death, to was there a cause of action for negligence against the governmental entity
at the time of the enactment of the constitution. This question is unequivocally and
resoundingly YES.
Negligence was a cause of action against governmental entities when Utah
adopted its constitution. See Thomas v. Springville City, 35 P. 503 (Utah 1894)
(city liable for negligent maintenance of a bridge where plaintiff was injured);
Hopkins v. Ogden City, 16 P. 596 (Utah 1888) (city was negligent when horse fell
through a break in a water pipe); Yearance v. Salt Lake City, 24 P. 254 (Utah
1890); (city negligently placed bricks across a walkway, which injured plaintiff);

Levy v. Salt Lake City, 16 P. 598, 604 (Utah 1887) (city is liable for injuries caused
through its neglect to keep in proper repair a ditch constructed over private
property); Tucker v. Salt Lake City, 37 P. 261 (Utah 1894) (city was negligent
when it built a steep grade sidewalk that caused plaintiff to fall and break her arm).
Further, even after the enactment of the procedural statute, 1898 Revised
Statutes of Utah § 929, courts continued to hear cases against Utah's cities for
negligence.

See, Lowe v. Salt Lake City, 44 P. 1050 (Utah 1896) (city was

negligent when Plaintiff fell into a hatchway behind city hall); Dwyer v. Salt Lake
City, 57 P. 535 (Utah 1899) (city was negligent for not maintaining street).
Because negligence was a cause of action against a governmental entity
when the Utah Constitution was adopted; and because the wrongful death statute
was enacted prior to the adoption of the Constitution; and because the wrongful
death statute applied to every case of negligence; a cause of action for wrongful
death existed at the time the Utah Constitution was adopted. The Governmental
Immunity Act abrogated that existing cause of action for wrongful death; therefore
the Governmental Immunity Act is unconstitutional as applied in this case.

IV.

AS APPLIED, THE GOVERNMENTAL
VIOLATES THE PETITION CLAUSE
CONSTITUTION.

IMMUNITY ACT
OF THE UTAH

The Utah State Constitution provides that "[a]ll men have the inherent and
inalienable right to . . . petition for redress of grievances . . . ."

UTAH CONST,

art. I,

§ 1 (1896). A "petition" is merely "[a] formal written request presented to a court
or other official body . . . . In some states, a lawsuit's first pleading." Black's Law
Dictionary 1182 (8th Ed. 2004). InKish v. Wright, 562 P.2d 625 (Utah 1977), the
Utah Supreme Court recognized that "the Constitution of Utah . . . gives its citizens
the 'inherent and inalienable' right to petition a state tribunal for redress of
grievances in civil actions." Id. at 627; see also In re Anderson, 2004 UT 7, % 68,
82 P.3d 1134 ("In filing a civil action . . . Judge Anderson exercised his right to
petition for redress of grievances."). Clearly, civil actions such as Grappendorfs'
are petitions for the redress of grievances, and are therefore constitutionally
protected.
In this case, the Fourth District Court did not address Grappendorfs' Petition
Clause Claims. Instead, it simply held that the Governmental Immunity Act barred
Plaintiffs5 claims. In effect, however, the court's decision implicitly held that the
Governmental Immunity Act could alienate Grappendorfs' right to petition for the
redress of their grievances.

On its face, such a conclusion unconstitutionally

abrogates the Appellants' right to petition for the redress of their grievances. The

Appellate Court should address this issue by first interpreting and giving effect to
the Petition Clause from the Utah State Constitution, and then weighing that
provision against the legislation at issue—both matters of first impression.
CONCLUSION
Initially, and dispositively as to this appeal, the trial court erred when it
interpreted and the "natural condition" exception so as to improperly draw the case
within the Governmental Immunity Act. The Grappendorfs' Open Court rights
have been abrogated in two ways, first by unreasonably broad interpretation of the
"natural condition" exception, and second, by defining "government function" so
broadly as to make the proprietary function of maintaining a baseball field immune
from suit, contrary to Laney v. Fairview, which.
The Court should revisit and reverse Teide v. State of Utah, and find that a
governmental entity was liable for negligence and that a wrongful death action
existed at the time the Utah Constitution was adopted, therefore, the Governmental
Immunity Act abrogated an existing right of the Grappendorfs.

The Supreme

Court of Utah must find the statute is unconstitutional when applied to wrongful
death cases.

Respectfully submitted this 12th day of September 2006.
MORIARITY, BADARUDDIN & BOOKE

-7^

7^^/

BRADfcEf L. BOOKE
ROBERT D.STRIEPER
Attorneys for Appellants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 12th day of September, 2006, I caused the
original and nine copies and one CD of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE
APPELLANTS to be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court, and two copies to:

PETER STIRBA
GARY R. GUELKER
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES
215 South State, Suite 1150
P.O. Box 810
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-0810

-f

Tabl

DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

Art I § 1

ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS
Section
1 [Inherent and inalienable rights ]
2 [All political power inherent in the people ]
3 [Utah inseparable from the Union ]
4 [Religious liberty — No property quahfica
tion to vote or hold office ]
5 [Habeas corpus ]
6 [Right oo bear arms ]
7 [Due process of law ]
8 [Offenses bailable ]
9 [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punishments ]
10 [Trial by jurv j
11 [Courts open — Redress of injuries ]
12 [Rights of accused persons ]
13 [Prosecution b \ information or indictment
— Grand jury ]
14 [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issuance of warrant ]

Section
15 [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel ]
16 [No imprisonment for debt — Exception ]
17 [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting]
18 [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impair
mg contracts ]
19 [Treason defined — Proof]
20 [Military subordinate to the civil power ]
21 [Slavery forbidden ]
22 [Private propertv for public use ]
23 [Irrevocable franchises forbidden ]
24 [Uniform operation of laws ]
25 [Rights retained bv people ]
26 [Provisions mandators ana prohibitory ]
27 [Fundamental rights ]

Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.]
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their
lives and liberties to acquire, possess and protect property to worship according to the dictates of their consciences to assemble peaceably protest against
wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances to communicate freely their
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right
History Const. 1896
NOTES TO DECISIONS
morals welfare or some similarly important
consideration of the public weal Rithoizv City
of Salt Lake 3 Utah 2d 385 284 P 2d 702
(1955)

ANALYSIS

Advertising prombmon
Cigarette law
Consequences of obscenity conviction
Family law
License fees
Liauor prombition and control
Motorcvcle Helmet law
Picketing
Polygamy
Property n g h t s generally
Residence reauirement for city officers and emolovees
Succession to property
Unfair Practices Act

Cigarette law
The cigarette law does not infringe this sec
tion State v Packer Corp 77 Utah 500 297 P
1013 (1931)
C o n s e q u e n c e s of o b s c e n i t v c o n v i c t i o n
City ordinance providing for the suspension
of an adult theater license upon conviction of
the licensee for violation of the citv s obscenity
ordinances was a proper prior restraint on the
right to free speech West Gallery Corp v Salt
Lake City Bd of Comm rs 586 P 2d 429 (Utah
1978)
Enjoining future operations of a bookstore
after revocation of its license upon conviction
of licensee for violation of city obscenity ordinances was not an unconstitutional prior re-

Advertising prohibition
A. city ordinance that prohibits price adver
tismg of eyeglasses is an invalid limitation on
rights guaranteed m this section since such a
limitation is not necessary for the health
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Tab 2

DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
Utah State Constitution, 1986 Utah L Rev
319
Recent Developments m Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Criminal Law 1988 Utah L
Rev 177
Am Jur 2d — 47 Am J u r 2a J u r y § 7 et
seq
C.J.S — 50 C J S Juries § 9 et seq
A.L.R. — Driving while intoxicated or sum
lar offense right to trial by jury m criminal
prosecution for 16 A L R 3d 1373
Right in equitv suit to jurv trial of counter
claim involving legal issue 17 x4> L R 3d 1321
Issues in garnishment as triable to court or
to jury 19 A L R 3d 1393
Automobiles validity and construction of
legislation authorizing revocation or suspen-

Art I, § 11

sion of operator's license for " h a b i t u a l " "persistent," or "frequent" violations of traffic regulations 48 A L R 4th 367
J u r y trial waiver as binding on later state
civil trial 48 A . L R 4 t h 747
Paternity proceedings right to jury trial 51
A L R 4 t h 565
Right to jury trial in action for retaliatory
discharge from employment 52 A L R 4th
1141
Right to jurv trial m state court divorce proceedings 56 A L R 4th 955
Jury trial rights m and on appeal from
small claims court proceeding, 70 A L R 4th
1119
Key Numbers — Jury ®= 9 et seq

Sec, 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him m his
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay, and no person
shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal m this
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party
History: C o n s t 1896.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
4.NALYSIS

Action under Civil Rights Act of 1871
Actions by court
Actions bv state
Actions not created
Arbitration Act
Assignments
Attornevs duties
Criminal law
—Suspension of execution of death sentence
Debt collection
District court jurisdiction
Election contest
Forum non conveniens
Injurv or damage to propertv
Intoxicating liquor
Land Registration A.ct
Limitations
—Limitations of actions
—Statutory limitation of review
Occupational disease law
Sovereign immunity
Torts
—A.ction bv wife against husband
—Loss of consortium
Unlicensed law practice
Waiver of rights
W o n a n e n s compensation law
Cited

Action under Civil Rights Act of 1871.
Jurisdiction over actions brought under the
Civil Rignts \ c t of 1871 42 U S C 1981 et
seq is vested ongmallv m the federal courts
but the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by
state courts is not thereby prohibited in view
of the provisions of this section therefore it
was error for trial court to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction otherwise proper action Drought
under 42 U S C 1983 Kish v W n g n t 562 V2a
625 (Utah 1977)
Trial court would not err in dismissing ac
tion brought under ^2 U S C 1983 on the
ground of forum non convemens in a proper
case but such dismissal should be without
prejudice so that the plaintiff might move his
suit to another forum without harm to his
claim Kish v Wright 562 P 2d 625 (Utan
1977)
Actions by court.
Court of equity has jurisdiction to open probate proceeding and to proceed against bond of
administratrix where she has practiced extrinsic fraud on the court Weyant v Utah Sav &
Trust Co 54 Utah 181 182 P 189 9 \ L R
1119 (1919)
Actions by state.
This section did not alter the law with respect to certain rights which are vested m the
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Tab 3

LABOR

Art XVI, § 5

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 48 Am J u r 2d Labor and
Labor Relations §§ 21 to 28

C.J.S. — 51 C J S Labor Relations § 8
Key Numbers. — Labor Relations «= 24

Sec. 5. [Injuries resulting in death — Damages,]
The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting m death, shall
never be abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any
statutory limitation, except m cases where compensation for injuries resulting
m death is provided for by law
History: Const. 1896; L. 1919 (S.S.), S.C.R.
1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Beech Aircraft Corp, 717 P 2d 670 (Utah
1985;

ANALYSIS

Claim of dependents
Conflict of laws
Product Liability Act
PurDose of amendment
Railroad pass
Workers compensation
Claim of dependents.
Under this section, it is beyond the power of
the legislature to take from dependents of an
employee their claim against tne employer
where such employee dies as the result of a
wrongful injury by the employer Hailing v
Industrial C o m m a 71 Utah 112 263 P 78
(1927)
Conflict of laws.
In action brought m Colorado by father to
recover for alleged wrongful death of son while
passenger on defendant s bus, as result of accident which occurred m Utah, father s n g h t to
recover and amount of recovery was governed
by constitutional and statutory provisions of
Utah Stolz v Burlington TransD Co 178 F 2d
514, 15 A L R 2 d 759 QOth Cir 1949)
In wrongful death action by Utan resident
against Colorado residents in which Utah
court had quasi m rem jurisdiction Utah court
applied Utah law on matter concerning any
limitation placed on the amount of damages
recoverable Rhoades v Wngnt, 622 P 2d 343
(Utah 1980), cert denied, 454 U S 897 102 S
Ct 397 70 L Ed 2d 212 (1981)
Product Liability Act.
Section 78-15-3 a limitations provision m
the Utah Product Liability Act which prior to
1989, barred actions without regard to when
an injury occurs and was not designed to provide a reasonable time withm which to file a
lawsuit was unconstitutional because it violated this section and the open courts clause of
the Utah Constitution Berry ex rel Berry v

Purpose of amendment.
The 1920 amendment to this section which
added the exception was not designed or intended to preserve all rights formerly guaranteed and also to create new rights on contrary
its very purpose was to abrogate some rignts
formerly heid by persons entitled to sue under
wrongful death statute Henrie v Rocky Mt
Packing Corn , 113 Utan 415, 196 P 2d 487
(1948), rehearing denied, 113 Utah 444 202
P 2 d 727 (1949)
Railroad pass.
Provision m free pass issued to employee absolving railroad from liability was valid and
effective as to interstate commerce in view of
federal decisions which prevail over conflicting
state law heirs of employee wno was killed
while riding as interstate passenger on such
pass were precluded thereby as matter of law
from recovering under this section as against
railroad company for ordinary negligence as
distinguished from wanton or gross negligence
notwithstanding this constitutional provision,
since decedent could not have recovered therefor had he lived Francis v Southern Pac Co
333 U S 445 68 S Ct 611 92 L Ed 798
11948)
Workers' compensation.
Prior to the amendment of this provision, m
all cases of death by wrongful act or neglect
widow could not waive rights of minor children
to action for damages and accept workers compensation Garfield Smelting Co v Industrial
Comm'n 53 Utah 133 178 P 57 {1918)
Minor heirs of deceased workman, including
unborn child would be bound by industrial
commission s award upon application of widow,
thus award was not overturned on contention
that employer might be exposed to double ha-
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_. Grounds

^ _ Excusable n e g l e c t
" A default certificate mav be set aside upon
nrnunds 01 excusable neglect Heathman v Fa
£ * & Clendemn 14 Utah 2d 60 3 " - P2d 189
(1962)
While reliance on an attorneys assurances
that one s rights are being protected could m
the appropriate circumstances be seen as ex
cusabie neglect trial court properl} refused to
excuse the neglect of a defendant who failed to
establish that she was so represented Miller v
Brocksmith 825 P2d 690 (Utah Ct App 1992)
—Judicial attitude
Where any reasonable excuse is offered b \
defaulting party courts generally tend to favor
granting relief from a default judgment unless
to do so would result m substantial prejudice or
injustice to the adverse parrv Westmghouse
"Elec SuDplv Co v Paul W Larsen Contractor
544 P 2d 876 (Utah 1975)
—Movant's duty
Party wno seeks to have a default
set aside must proffer some defense
sufficient ostensible merit to justify
4hat issue Downey State Bank
^Blakene} Com 545 P2d 507 (Utah

judgment
of at least
a trial on
v Major
1976)

h—Setting aside proper
T*~ Where plaintiff se^-ved defendant with a sum
- mons and left a cony with the deiendant whicn
jwas not the same as the original uhe court had
^unsenction but sufficient confusion was ere
jtted so that a motion to set aside the default
judgment snould have been granted and the

Kuie oo

defenaant allowed to plead consistenc with our
declared pohev that m case of uncertainty
default judgments should be set aside to allow
trial on the merits Locke v Peterson 3 Utah 2d
^15 285 P2d 1111 (1955
Default judgment and writ of garnishment
were Droperly set aside where trial court iailed
to ootain jurisdiction over defendant because
summons was not timely issued Fibreboard
Paper Prods Corp v Dietrich 25 Utah 2d 65
475 P2d 1005 (1970)
Where appellants plaintiffs in a civil action
promptly objected to date set for trial on the
ground that their counsel had an already
scheduled appearance in another court on that
date but due to fact that there were no law or
motion davs between time oojection was filed
and trial aate objection wa« never heard re
fusal to set aside default judgment entered
when appellants failed to appear on oial date
was an abuse of discretion Griffiths v
Hammon 560 P2d 1375 (Utah 19r"p*
Tune for appeal
Unaer former Rule 73(h the time for appeal
from a aeiault judgment in a citv court ran from
the aate of notice of entrv oi such juagment
ratner Jian from the date of judgment Buck
ner v Mam Realtv & Ins Co 4 Utan 2a 124
288 P2d nS6 1955 but see Central Bank &
Trust Co v Jensen aupra and Rule 58A(d)
Cited in Utan Sand & Gravel Prods Corp v
Tolbert 16 Utah 2d 40" 402 P 2 a ^03 ±965)
J P W Enters Inc v Naef 604 P2d 486 Utah
1979) Katz v Pierce "32 P2d 92 Utah 1986)
Lund v Brown 2000 UT 75 l l P3d 27"

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law R e v i e w — Reason
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for In
;sonam Deiault Judgment in Utah Granam
gawa\a 1981 B YU L Rev 9 3 "
Jur 2a — 46 4m J u r 2d Judgments §
> et seq
B.J S — 49 C J S Judgments ^§ 18" to 218
..R — Necessity oi taking proof as to
lirv against aeiaultmg defenaant
8
LR3d 1070
peaiabihtv of order setting aside or refus
to set asiae default judgment 8 \ L R 3d
sfaulting deiendant s i-ight to notice and

hearing as to determination oi amount oi dam
ages 15 A L R 3 d 586
Openmg default or default judgment claimed
to have been obtained because of attorneys
mistake as to time or place oi appearance trial
or filing of necessarv papers 21 \ L R 3d 1255
Failure to give notice of application for de
fault judgment where notice is required onlv D\
custom 28 \ L R 3d 1383
Failure or party or his attornev to appear at
pretrial conierence So ^ L R 3d 303
Deiault judgments against f he Unitea States
under Rule 55ie of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 55 \ L R Fed 190

le 56, Summary judgment.
EJa) For claimant \ partv seeking to recover upon a claim counterclaim or
Bs-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment mav at anv time after the
pration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
potion for bummarv judgment bv the adverse partv move for summary
gaient upon all or any part thereof
g) For defending party A party against whom a claim counterclaim or
s-ciarm is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sougnt may at any time
l * o r s u nimary judgment as to all or any part thereof
lotion and proceedings thereon The motion memoranda and affidavits
3e in accordance with Rule 7 The judgment sought shall be rendered if
eadings depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file,

Rule 56
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together with the affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be
rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to
the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial
controvers}7, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other
relief is not in controversy and directing such further proceedings in the action
as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits: further testimony; defense required. Supporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed b}? depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing t h a t there is a
genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered
against a party failing to file such a response.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a
party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse
the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to
be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant
to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the
court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party
the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused,
including reasonable attornej^s fees, and any offending party or attorney may
be adjudged guilty of contempt,
(Amended effective November 1, 1997: November 1, 2004.)
Amendment Notes. — The 2004 amendment substituted "move for summary judgment r for "move with or without supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor"
in Subdivisions (a) and (b); in Subdivision (c).
deleted "filed and served" before "in accordance
with' and substituted \Rule 7 for "CJA 4-501 ;
substituted "If for "Should it appear to the

satisfaction of the court at any time that" at the
beginning of the first sentence in Subdivision
(g); and made stylistic changes throughout.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 5 ^ F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. - Contempt generally,
tc 78-7-18 78-32-1 et sea
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UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERALCHAPTER 30. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
63-30-2 Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Claim" means any claim or cause of action for money or damages
against a governmental entity or against an employee.
(2)
(a)
"Employee"
includes
a
governmental
entity's officers,
employees, servants, trustees, commissioners, members of a governing
body, members of a board, members of a commission, or members of an
advisory body, officers and employees in accordance with Section 67-5b104, student teachers holding a letter of authorization in accordance
with Sections 53A-6-103 and 53A-6-104, educational aides, students
engaged in providing services to members of the public in the course of
an approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care
clinical training program, volunteers, and tutors, but does not include
an independent contractor.
(b) "Employee" includes all of the positions identified in Subsection
(2) (a), whether or not the individual holding that position receives
compensation.
(3) "Governmental entity" means the state and its political subdivisions
as defined in this chapter.
(4) (a) "Governmental function" means any act, failure to act,
operation, function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or
not the act, failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking is
characterized
as
governmental, proprietary,
a core governmental
function, unique to government, undertaken in a dual capacity,
essential to or not essential to a government or governmental function,
or could be performed by private enterprise or private persons.

agency, employee, agent, or officer of a governmental enniry.
(5) "Injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of
property, or any other injury that a person may suffer to his person, or
estate, that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or his
agent.
(6) "Personal
damage.

injury"

means

an injury

of

any

kind

other than property

(7) "Political subdivision" means any county, city, town, school district,
public transit district, redevelopment agency, special improvement or
taxing district, or other governmental subdivision or public corporation.
(8) "Property damage" means injury to, or loss
estate, or interest in real or personal property.

of, any right, title,

(9) "State" means the state of Utah, and includes any office, department,
agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital, college,
university, or other instrumentality of the state.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 2; 1973, ch. 103, § 2; 1978, ch. 27, § 1; 1981,
ch. 116, § 1; 1983, ch. 129, § 2; 1987, ch. 75, § 2; 1987 (1st S.S.), ch. 4,
§ 1; 1988, ch. 2, § 338; 1991, ch. 248, § 6; 1994, ch. 192, § 1? 1994, ch. 260,
§ 79? 1999, ch. 108, § 32; 2000, ch. 224, § 12.
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
Amendment Notes. — T h e 1994 amendment by ch. 192, effective May 2, 1994,
substituted "Section 67-5b-104" for "Section 62A-4-603" in Subsection (2)(a)
and made a punctuation change.
The 1994 amendment by ch. 260, effective July 1, 1994, substituted
62A-4a-503" for "Section 62A-4-603" in Subsection (2)(a).

"Section

The 1999 amendment, effective July 1, 1999, substituted "Section 53A-6-104" for
"Section 53A-6-101" in Subsection (2)(a).
The 2000 amendment, effective May 1, 2000, in Subsection (2) (a) substituted
"holding a letter of authorization" for "certificated" and "Sections 53A-6-103
and" for "Section."
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Constitutionality.
Construction and application.
Governmental entity.
Governmental function.
Injury.
School boards.
State.
Cited.

The 1987 amendment of Subsection (4)(a), eliminating the distinction between
governmental and proprietary functions to determine the scope of immunity, is
unconstitutional as it applies to municipalities operating electrical power
systems; the provision violates the open courts clause of Utah Const., Art. I,
§ 11. Laney v. Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, 57 P.3d 1007.
Plaintiffs could maintain action against city for alleged negligence in the
maintenance of power lines, even though maintenance decisions fell within the
discretionary function exception of § 63-30-10, because Subsection (4)(a) of
this section is unconstitutional to the extent it makes the operation of
electrical power systems by municipalities a governmental function. Laney v.
Fairview City, 2002 UT 79, 57 P.3d 1007.
Construction and application.
Fulfilling the requirements of this chapter does not excuse a plaintiff from
also complying with the procedural requirements of the Malpractice Act (Title
78, Chapter 14) if both apply, and failure to comply with all the procedural
requirements of each act, when both are implicated, may be fatal to the cause
of action. Carter v. Milford Valley Mem'l Hosp., 2000 UT App 21, 996 P.2d 1076.
Governmental entity.
Complaint of inmate of state prison for damages from injuries inflicted by
fellow prisoner was properly dismissed as to state because state is
governmental entity and because statute waiving sovereign immunity from
negligent acts of governmental entities specifically excepts injuries arising
out of incarceration of any person in any state prison from the operation of
the statute; although warden of the state prison is not "governmental entity"
within statute and consequently was not immune from suit for alleged
negligence, complaint against him was properly dismissed under common-law rule
that where one inmate has injured another, warden and other prison officers are
protected by doctrine of sovereign immunity against claims of negligence so
long as they are acting in good faith. Sheffield v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 314, 445
P.2d 367 (1968) .
A judge is an officer of a state governmental entity and is therefore an
employee for purposes of the notice of claim requirements of § 63-30-11. Spoons
v. Lewis, 1999 UT 82, 987 P.2d 36.
Governmental function.
Operation of sewage facilities by sanitary district was governmental function
and, prior to Governmental Immunity Act, district enjoyed immunity from suit
for damages. Johnson v. Salt Lake County Cottonwood San. Dist., 20 Utah 2d 389,
438 P.2d 706 (1968) .
County's failure to indemnify state prison psychiatrist for costs incurred in
defending an action that arose from acts or omissions within the scope of her
employment was plainly a governmental function. The county was thus immune from
suit for any alleged injuries caused by the exercise of that function unless
that immunity was expressly waived. Atiya v. Salt Lake County, 852 P. 2d 1007
(Utah Ct. App. 1993) .
Trial court's retroactive application of the 1987 amendment modifying the
definition of "governmental function" so as to bar a claim against the Utah

P.2d 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
injury.
When state university constructed building, parking lot, and road, diverting
surface water flow onto adjoining owner's land and basement, landowner was
"injured" within meaning of this section. Sanford v. University of Utah, 26
Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d 741 (1971).
The language "any other
generalized enumerated
indicates an intent to
plaintiffs might allege
49, 26 P.3d 217.

injury that a person may suffer,'1 in addition to the
categories listed in the definition of "injury,"
draw a broad net over the multitudinous harms that
against government officials. Thomas v. Lewis, 2001 UT

School boards.
A school board is not an arm of the state for purposes of the Eleventh
Amendment and is consequently not entitled to immunity from § 19 83 suits in
federal court. Ambus v. Granite Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1993).
State.
The University of Utah is an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment immunity
purposes. Pharmaceutical & Diagnostic Servs., Inc. v. University of Utah, 801
F. Supp. 508 (D. Utah 1990).
Cited in Ledfors v. Emery County Sch. Dist., 849 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1993); Wright
v. University of Utah, 876 P. 2d 380 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 883 P. 2d
1359 (Utah 1994); J.B. v. Washington County, 905 F. Supp. 979 (D. Utah 1995),
aff'd, 127 F.3d 919 (10th Cir. 1997).; Larson v. Park City Mun. Corp., 955 P.2d
343 (Utah 1998) .
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. —Recent Developments in Case Law:
Awarding Attorney Fees
incurred in Recovering Fees Allowed by Statute: "Fees-for-Fees" Under Utah Code
§ 63-30a-2, 1997 Utah L. Rev. 146.
Copyright © 2003 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the of the

LexisNexis Group.
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UTAH CODE, 195 3
TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL
CHAPTER 30. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
63-30-3 Immunity of governmental entities from suit.
(1) Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental
entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise of
a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or other
governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, nursing, or
other professional health care clinical training program conducted in either
public or private facilities.
(2) Subsections (2)(a) through (c) are unique or essential core governmental
functions and, notwithstanding the waiver of immunity provisions of Section 6330-10, governmental entities, political subdivisions, and their officers and
employees are immune from suit for any injury or damage resulting from the
implementation of or the failure to:
(a) implement measures to control the causes of epidemic and communicable
diseases and other conditions significantly affecting the public health or
necessary to protect the public health as set out in Title 26A, Chapter 1,
Local Health Departments;
(b) investigate and control suspected bioterrorism and disease as set out
in Title 26, Chapter 23b, Detection of Public Health Emergencies Act; and
(c) respond to a national, state, or local emergency, a public health
emergency as defined in Section 26-23b-102, or a declaration by the
President of the United States or other federal official requesting public
health-related activities.
(3) (a) For the purposes of this chapter only, the following state medical
programs and services performed at a state-owned university hospital are
unique or essential to the core of governmental activity in this state and
are considered to be governmental functions:

of the high risk nature of the patient's medical condition;
(ii) high risk care or procedures available in Utah only at a stateowned university hospital or provided in Utah only by physicians
employed at a state-owned university acting in the scope of their
employment;
(iii) care of patients who cannot receive appropriate medical care or
treatment at another medical facility in Utah; and
(iv) any other service or procedure performed at a state-owned
university hospital or by physicians employed at a state-owned
university acting in the scope of their employment that a court finds
is unique or essential to the core of governmental activity in this
state.
(b) If any claim under this Subsection (3) exceeds the limits established
in Section 63-30-34, the claimant may submit the excess claim to the Board
of Examiners and the Legislature under Title 63, Chapter 6.
(4) The management of flood waters and other natural disasters and the
construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental
entities are considered to be governmental functions, and governmental entities
and their officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or damage
resulting from those activities.
(5) Officers and employees of a Children's Justice Center are immune from suit
for any injury which results from their joint intergovernmental functions at a
center created in Title 62A, Chapter 4a, Child and Family Services.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 3; 1978, ch. 27, § 2; 1981, ch. 116, § 2; 1984,
ch. 33, § 1; 1985, ch. 93, § 1; 1991, ch. 15, § 1; 1991, ch. 248, § 7; 2003,
ch. 3, § 5.
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS
Amendment Notes. — T h e 2003 amendment, effective February 18, 2 003, added
Subsection (2), redesignating the following subsections accordingly; added
"(3)" in Subsection (3)(b); and added "Child and Family Services" in Subsection
(5).
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Constitutionality.
Building code.
Construction and application.
Drainage system.
Equitable claims.
Escrowed fund disbursement.
Extent of immunity.
Failure or omission to act.
Financial institution supervision.
Flood control.
Golf courses.
Governmental function.

Hospitals.
Misrepresentation by city.
Personal liability.
Prisoners.
Proprietary or governmental function.
Recreation.
Right to maintain action.
Schools and school districts.
Sewer system.
Street repair and construction.
Subdivision plan approval.
Takings clause claim.
Test for determining immunity.
Waiver of immunity.
Water storage tank.
Water system.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
It is within power of legislature to impose such conditions upon right to sue
cities and towns, which are merely arms of state government, as in its judgment
may seem wise and proper. Berger v. Salt Lake City, 56 Utah 403, 191 P. 23 3, 13
A.L.R. 5 (1920).
Building code.
A city municipal corporation, its agents, and its architectural consultant were
immune from suit by plaintiffs who had purchased and renovated a hotel in the
city and in order to enjoy certain tax advantages wanted to obtain an occupancy
permit, but the city's hired architectural firm reported code violations and
the city denied the occupancy permit. D.C.A. Dev. Corp. v. Ogden City Mun.
Corp., 965 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1992).
Construction and application.
This section indicates an intention that the act be strictly applied to
preserve sovereign immunity and to waive it only as clearly expressed therein.
Holt v. Utah State Rd. Comm. , 30 Utah 2d 4, 511 P.2d 1286 (1973); Epting v.
State, 546 P.2d 242 (Utah 1976).
The 1984 amendment to this section could not be applied retroactively.to bar a
valid cause of action that had already arisen when the amendment went into
effect. Irvine v. Salt Lake County, 785 P.2d 411 (Utah 1989); Rocky Mt. Thrift
Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989).
Drainage system.
Construction, operation, and maintenance of a creek drainage system was a
governmental function. Rocky Mt. Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp.,
784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989) .
Equitable claims.
Governmental immunity is not a defense to equitable claims. Bowles v. State ex
rel. Department of Transp., 652 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1982); Bennett v. Bow Valley

P.2d 207 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Escrowed fund disbursement.
The supervision of disbursement of escrowed funds is not of such a unique
nature that it could only be performed by a governmental entity and is not
essential to the core of governmental activity; therefore, disbursement of
escrowed funds is not a governmental function for purposes of this section and
is not subject to the notice requirement of § 63-30-11. Cox v. Utah Mtg. & Loan
Corp., 716 P.2d 783 (Utah 1986).
Extent of immunity.
Classification of operation of governmental entity as "governmental function"
does not signal unconditional immunity under this section since the grant of
immunity is expressly subjected to operation of other sections of this act.
Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980).
Failure or omission to act.
This section provides immunity from suit for injuries resulting from both acts
of commission and omission involving the exercise of a governmental function.
Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983).
Financial institution supervision.
State's supervision of financial institutions is of such a unique nature that
it can only be performed by a governmental agency and constitutes the exercise
of a governmental function. Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983).
Flood control.
The grant of immunity for flood control activities under this section is
subject to the exception mentioned in the first paragraph. Hansen v. Salt Lake
County, 794 P. 2d 838 (Utah 1990); Provo City Corp. v. State ex rel. Dep' t of
Transp., 795 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1990).
In amending this section in 1984, the Legislature intended to specify flood
control activities as governmental functions, thus bringing those activities
within the Governmental Immunity Act. Thus, immunity for flood control
activities under this section is subject to the waiver provisions found in the
Governmental Immunity Act. Provo City Corp. v. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp.,
795 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1990) ; Hamblin v. City of Clearfield, 795 P.2d 1133 (Utah
1990) .
Golf courses.
Operation of a public golf course is not essential to governing and is
therefore not a governmental operation with result that city is not immune from
tort liability related to its operation of golf course. Standiford v. Salt Lake
City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980).
Governmental function.
A lender's complaint against the State Tax Commission, claiming that the
commission and its employees negligently failed to advise the lender that a
duplicate vehicle title had been issued and improperly issued to the borrower

barred by governmental immunity. The issuance of motor vehicle titles ana
recordkeeping responsibilities are governmental functions and have immunity
under this section. Further, the statutory waiver of immunity for negligence
does not apply, according to § 63-30-10(3), when the alleged injury arises out
of the issuance of a title certificate. Metropolitan Fin. Co. v. State, 714
P.2d 293 (Utah 1986).
The regulation of public safety needs and the evaluation, installation,
maintenance and improvement of safety signals or devices at railroad crossings
is a governmental function. Gleave v. Denver & R.G.W.R.R., 749 P.2d 660 (Utah
Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988).
The issuance of permits and certificates of occupancy and the administering of
building inspections as identified by the legislature in § 63-30-10 are "core"
governmental functions, so that a county's negligent acts or omissions relating
to those functions are expressly excepted from waiver of immunity. DeBry v.
Salt Lake County, 835 P.2d 981 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), aff'd sub nom. DeBry v.
Noble, 889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1995).
County was immune from negligence suit for the alleged injuries resulting from
county's failure to indemnify state prison psychiatrist for her separately
incurred defense costs, since under § 63-30-2(4)(a), a governmental entity's
failure to act is classified as a governmental function. Atiya v. Salt Lake
County, 852 P.2d 1007 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Driving an emergency vehicle to the scene of a fire is a "governmental
function" and is therefore presumptively cloaked with immunity. Lyon v. Burton,
2000 UT 19, 5 P.3d 616.
Plaintiffs could maintain action against city for alleged negligence in the
maintenance of power lines, even though maintenance decisions fell within the
discretionary function exception of § 63-30-10, because § 63-30-2(4)(a) was
unconstitutional to the extent it made the operation of electrical power
systems by municipalities a governmental function. Laney v. Fairview City, 2002
UT 79, 57 P.3d 1007.
Health care facilities.
While 197 8 amendment was not expressly made retroactive, the Supreme Court
considered it a manifestation of legislative intent; for that reason, the court
held, in a case which arose prior to the amendment, that operation of a
governmentally owned health care facility such as a university medical center
was a "governmental function" as contemplated by the statute prior to
amendment. Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 19 80).
County mental health facility was a "governmental health care facility" within
the meaning of this section. Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P. 2d 1053 (Utah
1989) .
Hospitals.
The state's operation of a hospital at a prison facility for treatment of
prisoners is a governmental function. Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978).
Misrepresentation by city.
City

is

immune

to

tort

action

for

deceit

and

misrepresentation

in its

competitive advantage had been granted to one corporation. Rapp v. Salt Lake
City, 527 P.2d 651 (Utah 1974).
Personal liability.
The Governmental Immunity Act has no application to individuals; however, under
common-law principles, a governmental agent performing a discretionary function
is immune from suit for injury arising therefrom, but an employee acting in a
ministerial capacity is not so protected; psychologist working with university
medical center on contractual basis and alleged to have been negligent in his
treatment
of
suicidal patient was performing
ministerial
rather than
discretionary acts, and thus was not afforded immunity from suit. Frank v.
State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980).
Prisoners.
Bailiff's action against state for gunshot wound inflicted by a prisoner was
properly dismissed, because either: (1) the prisoner had totally escaped the
control of the officers escorting him and was thus acting on his own so the
officers were not responsible for him, or (2) he was still under the control of
the officers, in which case the officers would be immune from suit under the
statute. Kirk v. State, 784 P.2d 1255 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Proprietary or governmental function.
Four factors to be considered in determining whether an activity is a
proprietary or a governmental function are: (1) whether the activity is
something that is done for the general public good; (2) whether it is generally
regarded as a public responsibility; (3) whether there is any special pecuniary
benefit to the city; and (4) whether it is in competition with free enterprise.
Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 530 P.2d 799 (Utah 1975).
Recreation.
Governmental immunity was not a bar to a negligence action against a city for
injuries sustained by a child when child's sled collided with a post on a city
owned golf course that was open to the public for sledding in the winter.
Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 629 P.2d 432 (Utah 1981).
Right to maintain action.
The right to maintain an action against the state or its political subdivisions
can result from a finding that the injury did not result from the exercise of a
governmental function, or from a finding that even though the injury resulted
from the exercise of a governmental function, the government's immunity has
been expressly waived. Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983).
Schools and school districts.
School, in pumping water out of its basement, was not engaged as a governmental
entity in the "management of flood waters" so as to be immune from suit. Branam
v. Provo School Dist., 780 P.2d 810 (Utah 1989).
School district was not shielded from possible liability for damages arising
from its negligence in the resurfacing of a school parking lot, which resulted
in surface water runoff on an adjoining landowner's property. Williams v.
Carbon County Bd. of E d u c , 780 P.2d 816 (Utah 1989).

County school district was immune from a negligence suit based on battery
arising out of the beating of one of its students by two schoolmates, since the
operation of a public school is a governmental function under § 63-30-2(4)(a).
Ledfors v. Emery County Sch. Dist., 849 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1993).
Because it is undisputed that the county school district is a governmental
entity discharging a governmental function, the district would be immune from
suit for alleged violation of public policy in discharge of employee. Broadbent
v. Board of Educ. , 910 P.2d 1274 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert, denied, 917 P.2d
556 (Utah 1996) .
Sewer system.
Governmental immunity was not a bar to an action by property owner against city
for damage sustained when water backed into his home due to city' s alleged
negligence in maintaining the sewer system. Thomas v. Clearfield City, 642 P.2d
737 (Utah 1982) .
An action for negligence against a sanitary district is not subject to the oneyear limitations period for actions against the government, since operation of
a sewer system is a nongovernmental function, and thus not protected by
governmental immunity. Dalton v. Salt Lake Sub. San. Dist., 676 P. 2d 399 (Utah
1984) .
Street repair and construction.
Duty of city to repair or construct streets within its corporate limits is a
governmental one, and in absence of statute no liability devolves on
municipality for defective condition of its streets. Niblock v. Salt Lake City,
100 Utah 573, 111 P.2d 800 (1941) (decided under former law).
Subdivision plan approval.
City was immune from a damage suit based on its refusal to approve a
subdivision plan, since its actions were deemed to be a "governmental
function." Seal v. Mapleton City, 598 P.2d 1346 (Utah 1979).
The inspection and acceptance of subdivision improvements are governmental
functions for which immunity has not been waived. Bennett v. Bow Valley Dev.
Corp., 797 P.2d 419 (Utah 1990).
Takings clause claim.
Governmental immunity does not preclude a suit under Amendment V of the United
States Constitution and Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution in a
proper case. Bennett v. Bow Valley Dev. Corp., 797 P.2d 419 (Utah 1990).
Test for determining immunity.
Test for determining governmental immunity is whether the activity under
consideration is of such a unique nature that it can only be performed by a
governmental agency or that it is essential to the core of governmental
activity; this new standard broadens governmental liability. However, the
position is consistent with the plain legislative intent of this chapter to
expand governmental liability. Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d
1230 (Utah 1980).

consideration is of such a unique nature that it can only be performed by a
governmental agency, referring not to what government may do but to what
government alone must do, or that it is essential to the core of governmental
activity, referring to those activities not unique in themselves but essential
to the performance of those activities that are uniquely governmental. Johnson
v. Salt Lake City Corp., 629 P.2d 432 (Utah 1981).
Waiver of immunity.
In Utah, government entities are immune from suit for injury resulting from the
exercise of governmental functions unless that immunity has been waived by the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act (Act). To determine whether immunity has been
waived for the particular activity for which a plaintiff is filing a claim, a
court must determine: (1) whether the activity is a governmental function, for
which the legislature has granted blanket immunity in Utah Code Ann. § 63- 303; (2) if the activity is an immunized governmental function, whether that
blanket immunity has been waived in § 63-30-8, 63-30-9, or 63-30-10; and (3) if
immunity has been waived, whether the Act contains an exception to that waiver
that would result in the retention of the immunity. Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v.
Sanpete County, 2002 UT 17, 42 P.3d 379.
Water storage tank.
The maintenance of a water storage tank is not uniquely governmental or
essential to the core of governmental activity; owners of residential property
could allege that a city's water storage tanks leaked water into their
residential
subdivision, causing
or adding to landslide problems that
obstructed the free use of their property. Bennett v. Bow Valley Dev. Corp,,
797 P.2d 419 (Utah 1990) .
Water system.
Where city operated water system as a commercial venture in a proprietary
capacity, it was liable for injuries allegedly suffered by plaintiff when she
stepped on loose water meter lid whether the meter was on plaintiff's property
or in the street. Gordon v. Provo City, 15 Utah 2d 287, 391 P.2d 430 (1964).
Cited in Healthcare Servs. Group v. Utah Dep't of Health, 2002 UT 5, 40 P. 3d
591.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
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under mob

Liability of municipality for property damage under mob violence statutes, 26
A.L.R.3d 1198.
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A.L.R.4th 1194.

not

particular,

duty

was

owed

under

Governmental tort liability for failure to provide
specifically threatened crime victim, 46 A.L.R.4th 948.
Failure to restrain drunk driver as ground of
governmental unit or officer, 48 A.L.R.4th 287.

circumstances, 38

police

liability

protection to

of state or local

Governmental liability for failure to post highway deer crossing warning signs,
59 A.L.R.4th 1217.
State's liability for personal injuries from criminal attack in state park, 59
A.L.R.4th 1236.
Tort liability of public authority for failure to remove parentally abused or
neglected children from parents' custody, 60 A.L.R.4th 942.
Tort liability of college or university for injury suffered by student as a
result of own or fellow student's intoxication, 62 A.L.R.4th 81.
Hospital's liability for injury allegedly caused by failure to have properly
qualified staff, 62 A.L.R.4th 692.
Liability to one struck by golf club, 63 A.L.R.4th 221.
Tort liability of college, university, fraternity, or sorority for injury or
death of member or prospective member by hazing or initiation activity, 6 8
A.L.R.4th 228.
Governmental liability for negligence in licensing, regulating, or supervising
private day-care home in which child is injured, 68 A.L.R.4th 266.
Right of one governmental
damages, 11 A.L.R.5th 630.
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to sue another

such

subdivision for

Municipal liability for negligent performance of building inspector's duties,
24 A.L.R.5th 200.
Liability of school or school personnel for injury to student resulting from
cheerleader activities, 25 A.L.R.5th 784.
Liability of municipality or other governmental unit
police protection from crime, 90 A.L.R.5th 273.

for failure to provide

Construction and application of Federal Tort Claims Act provision excepting
from coverage claims arising out of assault and battery (28 USCS § 2680(h)), 88
A.L.R. Fed. 7.
Claims arising from governmental conduct causing damage to plaintiff's real
property as within discretionary function exception of Federal Tort Claims Act
(28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(a)), 167 A.L.R. Fed. 1.
Liability of United States for failure to warn of danger or hazard not directly
created by act or omission of federal government and not in national parks as
affected by "discretionary function or duty" exception to Federal Tort Claims

Liability of United States for failure to warn of danger or hazard resulting
from governmental act or omission as affected by "discretionary function or
duty" exception to Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(a)), 170 A.L.R.
Fed. 365.
Liability of United States for failure to warn local police or individuals of
discharge, release, or escape of person who is deemed dangerous to public as
affected by "discretionary act or duty" exception to Federal Tort Claims Act,
171 A.L.R. Fed. 655.
Claims arising from conduct of governmental employer in administering or
failing to administer medical care as within discretionary function exception
of Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(a)), 172 A.L.R. Fed. 407.
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U.C.A. 1953 § 63-30-10
UTAH CODE, 195 3
TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL
CHAPTER 30. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
63-30-10 Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negligent act or omission
of employee —Exceptions.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed
within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of, in
connection with, or results from:
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function, whether or not uhe discretion is abused;
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious
prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander,
deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish,
or violation of civil rights;
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the failure
or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license,
certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization;
(4) a failure to make
negligent inspection;

an

inspection

or

by

making

an

(5) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or
proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause;

inadequate or

administrative

(6) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is negligent or
intentional;
(7) riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, mob violence, and
civil disturbances;

(9) the activities of the Utah National Guard;
(10) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city
jail, or other place of legal confinement;
(11) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands, any
condition existing in connection with an abandoned mine or mining
operation, or any activity authorized by the School and Institutional
Trust Lands Administration or the Division of Forestry, Fire and State
Lands;
(12) research or implementation
clearing of fog;

of cloud management

or seeding

for the

(13) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or natural disasters;
(14) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or storm systems;
(15) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while
accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14;

being

driven in

(16) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any highway,
road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge,
viaduct, or other structure located on them;
(17) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any public
building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other public improvement;
(18) the activities of:
(a) providing emergency medical assistance;
(b) fighting fire;
(c) regulating,
hazardous wastes;

mitigating,

or

handling

hazardous

materials

or

(d) emergency evacuations;
(e) transporting or removing injured persons to a place where emergency
medical assistance can be rendered or where the person can be
transported by a licensed ambulance service; or
(f) intervening during dam emergencies; or
(19) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform any
function pursuant to Title 73, Chapter 5a, Dam Safety, or Title 73,
Chapter 10, Board of Water Resources --Division of Water Resources, which
immunity is in addition to all other immunities granted by law.
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 10; 1975, ch. 194, § 11; 1982, ch. 10, § 1; 1985,
ch. 169, § 1; 1989, ch. 185, § 1; 1989, ch. 187, § 3; 1989, ch. 268, § 29;
1990, ch. 15, §§ 1, 2; 1990, ch. 319, §§ 1, 2; 1991, ch. 76, § 4; 1995, ch.
299, § 35; 1996, ch. 159, § 6; 1996, ch. 264, § 1; 2001, ch. 185, § 1.

Amendment
"School
Sovereign
Subsection

Notes. — T h e 2 9 95 amendment, effective May 1, 19 95, substituted
and Institutional Trust Lands Administration or the Division of
Lands and Forestry" for "Board of State Lands and Forestry" in
(11).

The 199 6 amendment by ch. 15 9, effective July 1, 1996, added "in connection
with, or results from" to the end of the introductory paragraph; deleted "or
results from" from the beginning of Subsection (7); deleted "or in connection
with" from the beginning of Subsection (8); and substituted "Division of
Forestry, Fire and State Lands" for "Division of Sovereign Lands and Forestry"
in Subsection (11) .
The 1996 amendment by ch. 264, effective July 1, 1996, added Subsection (19),
making a related stylistic change.
The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, added Subsection (18) (e),
redesignated former Subsection (18)(e) as (f), added chapter titles, and made
related changes.
Compiler's Notes. —Laws 1991, ch. 76, which amended this section and §§ 6 3-3 04, 63-30-8, 63-30-9, 63-30-10.5, 63-30-11, 63-30-33, 63-30-34, and 63-30-36,
provides in § 11 that " This act has prospective effect only and any changes to
the law caused by this act do not apply to any claims based upon injuries or
losses that occurred before the effective date of uhis act [April 29, 1991]."
Cross-References. —Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands, § 65A-1-4.
Indemnification of public officers and employees, §§ 63-30-36 to 63-30-38.
School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration, § 53C-1-201 et seq.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Constitutionality.
Applicability.
Approval of plat.
Assault and battery.
Building certification.
Discretionary function.
Emergency vehicles.
Escaped prisoner.
False arrest.
Foster care of children.
Hazardous waste.
Incarceration in state prison.
Injunctions.
Inspections.
Institution of proceedings.
Latent defective condition.
Legislative intent.
Licenses.
Misrepresentation.
Natural conditions.

Public school.
Release from detention.
Sale of recovered stolen property.
Schools.
Sovereign immunity.
State hospital patient.
Trees negligently cut.
Vehicle title certificate.
Cited.
Constitutionality.
The University of Utah performs a governmental function under the test
developed in Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P. 2d 1230 (1980); thus,
uhe immunity act is not unconstitutional as applied to a person who was injured
when assaulted and struck by an employee of the University. Wright v.
University of Utah, 876 P. 2d 380 (Utah Ct. App. ) , cert, denied, 883 P. 2d 1359
(Utah 1994).
In retaining governmental immunity from wrongful death suits against the state,
this section does not abrogate any previously existing right of action and
therefore does not violate Art. XVI, Sec. 5 of the Utah Constitution. Tiede v.
State Dep't of Cors., 915 P.2d 500 (Utah 1996).
Applicability.
Before the 1991 amendments to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, the
discretionary function and assault and battery exceptions in this section did
not apply to the waiver of immunity for defective or dangerous conditions in
government buildings in § 63-30-9. The amendments were not retroactive. Tavlor
ex rel. Taylor v. Qaden City Sen. Dist., 881 P. 2d 907 (Utah Ct. A P P . 1994 ) ,
rev'd on other grounds, 902 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1995).
The 1991 amendment of § 60-3 0-8, providing that the waiver provisions thereof
are subject to the discretionary function exception of this section, does not
apply retroactively. Keegan v. Spate, 896 P.2d 618 (Utah 1995).
Approval of plat.
A city's approval of a subdivision plat was clearly excepted by this section
from any waiver of immunity, and plaintiff's claim characterizing the city's
conduct as designing an intersection was effectively barred. De Villiers v.
Utah County, 882 P.2d 1161 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Assault and battery.
Subsection (2) provides that the negligence of a governmental employee is not
actionable when, as a result of that negligence, an assault or battery is
committed by another. Nothing suggests that the one committing the assault or
battery need be a government employee, and the entire focus of Subsection (2)
is upon the negligent government employee, not on the intentionally acting
assailant. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah 1993).
This section
arising out
governmental
855 P.2d 241

preserves immunity for negligence that resulted in an injury
of an assault or battery, even when the alleged negligent
act was the hiring of the assailant. Petersen v. Board of Educ.,
(Utah 1993) .

The State, a school district, the State School for the Deaf and Blind, and the
State Board of Education were exempt under Subsection (6) for injuries
resulting to plaintiff, a deaf child, who was sexually molested and assaulted
by a cab driver in taxi hired by the defendants to transport handicapped
children to school. S.R. ex rei. R.H. v. State, 865 P. 2d 1363 (Utah 1993).
Notwithstanding allegations that negligent implementation of a prerelease
program led to plaintiff's injuries by assault and battery at the hands of a
prerelease inmate, state defendants were immune from suit under the assault and
battery exception in Subsection (2). Malcolm v. State, 878 P.2d 1144 (Utah
1994)/
Plaintiff's complaint based on injuries received when she was assaulted and
struck by an employee of the University of Utah and asserting that the injuries
arose from the University's negligent hiring and supervision of the employee
rather than from a battery was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim.
This section focuses on the conduct or situation out of which the injury arose,
not on the theory of liability crafted by the plaintiff or the type of
negligence alleged. Wright v. University of Utah, 876 P.2d 380 (Utah Ct. App.),
cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994).
An amendment to a complaint based on injuries received when plaintiff was
assaulted and struck by an employee of the University of Utah alleging that,
because of his questionable mental condition, the employee lacked the requisite
intent for assault and battery, thus making Subsection (2) of this section
inapplicable, would be a fruitless attempt to circumvent the clear language of
the section. Wright v. University of Utah, 876 P.2d 380 (Utah Ct. App.), cert,
denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994).
Subsection (2) does not require that the person committing an assault and
battery must be engaged in a governmental function in order for a government
entity to qualify for immunity under this section. The immunity act specifies
only that a court examine generally whether the activity that the governmental
entity performs is a governmental function under § 63-30-2. Wright v.
University of Utah, 876 P. 2d 380 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 883 P. 2d 1359
(Utah 1994).
This section immunizes the state against a negligence action if "the injury
arises out of" assault or battery, and according to § 63-30-2, "injury" means
death, among other things; thus, a governmental entity is immune from a
negligence action for a death arising out of an assault or a battery. Tiede v.
State Dep't of Cors., 915 P.2d 500 (Utah 1996).
A claim against a school district for injuries to a student caused when he was
pushed into the window of a school bathroom by another student arose out of an
assault, and the district was immune from suit under the assault exception.
Taylor ex rel. Taylor v. Ogden City Sen. Dist., 927 P.2d 159 (Utah 1996).
Building certification.
The issuance of permits and certificates of occupancy and the administering of
building inspections are "core" governmental functions and a county's negligent
acts or omissions relating to those functions are expressly excepted from
waiver of immunity. DeBry v. Salt Lake County, 835 P. 2d 981 (Utah Ct. App.
1992), aff'd sub nom. DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1995).
Discretionary function.

Power of Public Service
construct and maintain
discretionary function,
immunity for injuries
Velasquez v. Union Pac.

Commission under § 54-4-14 to require public utiiitv to
appropriate safety devices at grade crossings is a
so this section excepts the commission from waiver of
caused by failure to require warnings at crossings,
R.R. , 24 Utah 2d 217, 469 P.2d 5 (1970).

The decision of a road supervisor to use berms as the sole method for warning a
traveler of a cur in an abandoned road was not a basic policy decision
essential to the realization or accomplishment of some basic governmental
policy, program, or objective, and therefore was not within the discretionary
function exception of this section. Carroll v. Stare Rd. Comm., 2~ Utah 2d 384,
496 P.2d 888 (19^2 ) .
Although the decision to build a highway and the general location of the
highway were discretionary functions of the state, preparation of plans and
specifications and supervision of the manner in which the work was carried out
were not "discretionary" within the meaning of this section and did not exempt
state from tort liability. Andrus v. State, 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975).
Psychiatric care of an individual patient is a ministerial, rather than a
discretionary, function. Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 19 80).
Psychologist working with university medical center on contractual basis and
alleged to have been negligent in his treatment of suicidal patient was acting
in a ministerial rather than discretionary capacity and thus was nor immune
from suit. Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980).
The design of a system of traffic-control semaphores did not involve "the basic
policy making level" nor constitute a discretionary act for which this section
would provide immunity to the state in a tort action alleging that dangerously
designed, constructed and maintained electric traffic-control semaphore caused
an auto accident resulting in personal injury. Bigeiow v. Ingersoil, 618 P.2d
5 0 (Utah 19 80) .
Failure of Department of Transportation to install different safety signals or
devices at a particular railroad crossing was a purely discretionary function
within the meaning of Subsection (1). Gleave v. Denver * R.G.W.R.R., 749 P. 2d
660 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988).
Alleged negligent conduct of a county employee in operating a backhoe pursuant
to a regular program of dredging stream channels to clear away silt, gravel
deposits, debris, and other matter which obstructed the flow of water did not
fall within the discretionary function exception of Subsection (1). Irvine v.
Salt Lake County, 7 85 P.2d 411 (Utah 1989).
Decisions regarding the design, capacity, and construction of a flood control
system were discretionary functions. Rocky Mt. Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake
City Corp., 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989).
Discretionary functions are those requiring evaluation of basic governmental
policy matters and do not include acts and decisions at the operational level -those everyday, routine matters not requiring evaluation of broad policy
factors. Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838 (Utah 1990).
Department of Transportation, which
ranks railroad
grade crossings in
allocating the limited funds available for crossing improvements, was immune
for its failure to do more than minimal warning and control at a crossing where

P.2d 595 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), aff'd, 842 P.2d 832 (Utah 1992).
The power of the Department of Transportation in determining what type of
warning devices should be required at railroad crossing is a discretionary
function which is protected by governmental immunity. Duncan v. Union Pac.
R.R., 842 P.2d 832 (Utah 1992).
The Department of Transportation's decision not to raise a concrete barrier
during highway surface overlay projects was not an operational decision
involving the negligent installation or maintenance of a traffic device, bur
involved a policy-based plan and the exercise of judgment and discretion; thus,
the decision was a discretionary act shielded from liability. Keegan v. State,
896 P.2d 618 (Utah 1995).
In a suit for damages against the city and the state for negligence in failing
to maintain a fence separating a playground from the Jordan River, where the
city and state were aware of the breach in the fence but did not repair it,
because the negligence alleged related directly to an operational decision on
the part of the governmental entity responsible for maintaining the fence, it
was not protected by discretionary function immunity. Nelson ex rel. Stuckman
v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568 (Utah 1996).
In an action for injuries suffered from an attack by a black bear at a
federally operated campground, where the state's interaction with the federal
forest service on wildlife matters met the discretionary function test, the
state was protected from liability by governmental immunity. Gadd ex rel. Gadd
v. United States, 971 F. Supp. 502 (D. Utah 1997).
Although the Governmental Immunity Act waives immunity for liabiiiry from
injuries caused by defective conditions of public buildings and highways, and
by the negligence of public employees, immunity is retained if, among other
things, an injury arose out of the exercise of or failure to exercise a
discretionary function, whether or not that discretion was abused. Trujilio v.
Utah DOT, 1999 UT App 227, 986 P.2d 752.
Department of Transportation was nor shielded by discretionary function
immunity because the plaintiffs' evidence as to the formulation and execution
of a traffic control plan refuted the contention that the relevant decisions
were made at the policy level rather than at the operational level. Trujilio v.
Utah DOT, 1999 UT App 227, 986 P.2d 752.
In debating the appropriate course of action in expending the city's money to
improve the public safety of the city railroad crossing, the city acted within
its statutory authority, and the city's decision involved just the sort of
policy-driven weighing of costs and benefits that the discretionary function
exception was meant to protect. Price v. Amtrak, 2 0 00 UT App 333, 14 P.3d 702.
Plaintiffs could maintain action against city for alleged negligence in the
maintenance of power lines, even though maintenance decisions fell within the
discretionary function exception of this section, because § 63-30-2(4)(a) was
unconstitutional to the extent it made the operation of electrical power
systems by municipalities a governmental function. Lanev v. Fairview City, 2 002
UT 79, 5 7 P.3d 10 07>
Emergency vehicles.
By enacting this section in 1991, the legislature reestablished the law in
respect of actions for the negligent operation of emeraencv vphirioc " " ^ ^

existed from the time the Governmental Immunity Act was first established. Day
v. State ex rei. Utah Dep ' t of Pub. Safety, 1999 UT 46, 980 ?.2d 1171.
Escaped prisoner.
State had not waived its immunity from suit for negligence in permitting escape
of state prisoner who subsequently killed plaintiffs1 mother; prisoner had
escaped from a work release program in which he was placed at the discretion of
prison authorities; therefore, stage's negligence, if any, arose out of
exercise of discretionary function and it was immune from suit under Subsection
(1) of this section; likewise, state was immune under Subsection (10) because
alleged negligence arose out of escapee's incarceration in a state prison.
Epting v. State, 546 P.2d 242 (Utah 1976).
Bailiff's action against state for gunshot wound inflicted by a prisoner was
properly dismissed, because either: (1) the prisoner had totally escaped the
control of the officers escorting him and was thus acting on his own so the
officers were not responsible for him, or (2) he was still under the control of
the officers, in which case the officers would be immune from suit under the
statute. Kirk v. State, 784 P.2d 1255 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
State was immune from liability for injuries caused by convicted felons during
an unauthorized departure from a half-way house, even though the state was
informed of the felons ' whereabouts and intentions but did not apprehend the
felons or protect the public. Tiede v. State Dep't of Cors., 915 P.2d 500 (Utah
1996).
False arrest.
City was immune from suit claiming that plaintiff was arrested on a bench
warrant due to city court clerk's failure to enter in the docket book that
plaintiff had paid his fine. Connell v. Tooele City, 572 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977).
Foster care of children.
Failure of Division of Family Services to properly evaluate a foster home, to
supervise child's placement and to protect her from harm was a breach of
conduct implemental in nature, and when found to be negligent entitled the
parents, upon the death of their child after she was placed in foster care, to
maintain a wrongful death action against the Division of Family Services, which
had obtained custody and guardianship of the child and placed her in foster
care. Little v. Utah State Div. of Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983).
Hazardous waste.
School district's activity in venting sewer gas from a school would be entitled
to immunity as a governmental function under Subsection (18)(c) if the district
could show that the gas was a hazardous waste under § 19-6-302(7). Lovendahl v.
Jordan Sch. Dist., 2002 UT 130, 63 P.3d 705.
Incarceration in state prison.
Complaint of inmate of state prison for damages from injuries inflicted by
fellow prisoner was properly dismissed as to state because statute waiving
sovereign immunity from negligent acts of governmental entities specifically
excepts injuries arising out of the incarceration of any person in any state
prison from the operation of the statute; although warden of state prison is

-J^^.**W.^J
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suit for alleged negligence, complaint against him was properly dismissed under
common-law rule that where one inmate has injured another, warden and other
prison officers are protected by doctrine of sovereign immunity against claims
of negligence so long as they are acting in good faith. Sheffield v. Turner, 21
Utah 2d 314, 445 P.2d 367 (1968).
The exception of the waiver of governmental immunity for injuries arising out
of the incarceration of a person in the state prison is not a denial of equal
protection nor is it against public policy. Madsen v. State, 58 3 P. 2d 9 2 (Utah
1978) .
This section barred a wrongful death action against the state and board of
corrections for death of a prisoner due to alleged negligent treatment of the
prisoner after surgery in the prison hospital. Madsen v. State, 583 P. 2d 92
(Utah 1978) .
State was immune under Subsection (10) of this section from claim of inmate for
negligent deprivation of property, but individual employees of the state were
not immune. Schmitt v. Billings, 600 P.2d 516 (Utah 19 79).
This section barred an action by an inmate against the state prison for
personal injuries he received in a fire at the prison where he was lawfully
incarcerated. Lancaster v. Utah State Prison, 740 P.2d 261 (Utah 1987).
Section 63-30-4(4), when combined with Subsection (10) of this section, which
retains government entities' immunity from liability for injuries arising out
of incarceration, effectively precludes prisoners from bringing negligence
actions against the state or prison physicians; however, this classification is
constitutional. Ross v. Schackel, 920 P.2d 1159 (Utah 1996).
Injunctions.
The Utah State Tax Commission, as an agency of the state of Utah, has immunity
from suits seeking to enjoin an investigation to determine whether a taxpayer
has violated any provision of the state individual income tax law. Hamilton v.
Mengel, 629 F. Supp. 1110 (D. Utah 1986).
Inspections.
The immunity granted in Subsection (4) was intended to immunize only the
conclusions and results of an inspection. It was not intended to shield the
inspector from liability for any negligent acts committed during an inspection.
Ericksen v. Salt Lake City Corp., 858 P.2d 995 (Utah 1993).
Summary judgment for the university on the ground of immunity wTas reversed
where the university's examination of its stadium bleachers for unsafe
conditions was an act of maintenance, not inspection under Subsection (4), and
plaintiff raised a material issue of factual dispute regarding whether the case
involved a latent defect under Subsection (17). Ilott v. University of Utah,
2000 UT App 286, 12 P.3d 1011.
Institution of proceedings.
The state has not waived its governmental immunity for negligence arising out
of the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative proceeding,
even if malicious or without probable cause. Devlin v. Smalley, 4 F. Supp. 2d
1315 (D. Utah 1998) .

Defect in a county storm drain that was discoverable by a reasonable inspection
was not a latent defect. Vincent v. Sal z Lake County, 5S2 P.2d 105 (Utah 1978).
Legislative intent,
Since the waiver of immunity in § 63-30-8 and § 63-30-9 encompasses a much
broader field of tort liability than merely negligent conduct of employees
within the scope of their employment, the Legislature could not have intended
that this section, with its exceptions, should modify the preceding two
sections even though it be conceded that the negligent conduct of an employee
might be involved in an action for injuries caused by the creation or
maintenance of a dangerous or defective condition. Sanford v. University of
Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d 741 (1971).
Licenses.
Governmental immunity provisions barred a negligence action against the
Department of Financial Institutions alleging that the department's failure to
regulate supervised lenders had resulted in investors' losses, where tne claims
asserted were for injuries arising out of licensing decisions allegedly made in
a negligent fashion. Ciiiixian v. Department of Fin. Insts., 782 P.2d 506 (Utah
1989); Hilton v. Borthick, 791 P.2d 5 04 (Utah 19 89),
Misrepresentation.
City is immune to tort action for deceit and misrepresentation in its
advertisement for construction bids which failed to disclose to bidders that a
competitive advantage had been granted to one corporation
Rapp v,. Salt Lake
City, 52 7 P. 2d 651 (Utah 19 7 4)..
Where a complaint alleged fraud against a building official for a county only
in his representative capacity, because the county could not have been liable
for injuries arising out of misrepresentation under Subsection (6) of this
section the building official for the county was likewise protected from
liability and the complaint failed to state a claim in fraud for which relief
could have been granted. DeBry v. Salt Lake County, 83 5 P.. 2d 981 (Utah Ct. App.
1992), aff'd sub nom. DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1995).
Natural conditions.
College officials were immune from claims filed by the parents of a student who
died in a fall from a cliff, because the cause of death was the naturally
occurring cliffs, not the act of planning a party in the vicinity of the
cliffs. Apffel v. Huddleston, 50 ?, Supp. 2d 1129 (D, Utah 1999).
When a plaintiff's injury either arises out of or in connection with or results
from a natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands, governmental
immunity is retained with respect to any action to recover for injuries
proximately caused by a government employee's negligence; the application of
the "natural condition" exception to the waiver of governmental immunity does
not hinge on whether the natural condition in any way proximately causes the
plaintiff's injuries.. B] ackner v. State, 2002 UT 44, 48 P.3d 949.
Under Subsection (11), the "arise out of" language requires only that there be
some causal nexus between the natural condition and the resultinq iniurv.

Plaintiff's state law claims against police officers for assault; unlawful
detention, and intentional infliction of emotional distress were barred by the
state governmental immunity act. Oliver v. woods; 2,1. ?. Supp, 2d 1325 (D. Utah
1998).
Public school.
In negligence suit for battery arising out of a public school beating of a
student by two schoolmates, the county school district was immune from
liabilitv,
Release from detention.
In a guardian's suit on behalf of her ward, who was assaulted by a juvenile,
summary judgment for the state and a Youth Detention Center superintendent was
reversed and remanded for a trial to determine whether the ward's injuries
resulted
from the superintendent's
negligence
in monitoring prescribed
treatment after making a discretionary decision to release the juvenile into
the community. Mary Doe v. Argueiles, 716 P.2d 27Q (Utah 1985).
Sale of recovered stolen property.
Where plaintiff's motorcycle was stolen,, recovered, held for -rial of alleged
thief, then sold by State Tax Commission without notice to plaintiff (who never
received notice letter), the motorcycle's sale did not involve such exercise of
"basic policy evaluation" as to make it a discretionary decision under
Subsection (1) of this section, but rather the decision to sell was an
operation function and not immune from attack; also, since defendant tax
commission never claimed taxes were owing on the motorcycle and no taxes were
deducted from, the sale price, and since the motorcycle was being held as
evidence in a criminal prosecution, the commission could not claim immunity on
basis of the tax exception under Subsection (8) of this section. Morrison v.
Salt Lake City Corp., 600 P.2d 553 (Utah 1979).

Like local school districts, the state school for the deaf and blind shares in
state sovereign immunity. Sutton, v. Utah State School for the Deaf k Blind, 17 3
F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1999) ,
Sovereign immunity.
Acts that are core governmental functions or are unique to government are
outside the protection of Utah Const., Art 1., Sec. 11; thus, in an action
against a county building official and the county for injuries based on
negligent inspection of a building and fraudulent issuance of a building
permit, the defendants' acts were core governmental functions within the scope
of the exceptions to waiver of immunity in Subsections (3) and (4). DeBrv v.
Noble, 889 P. 2d 428 (Utah 1.995) .
Subsections (3) and (4) of § 63-30-4 contemplate that a government employee can
be sued for fraud even if the employee acted in. a representative capacity;
thus, even though the governmental agency may be immune from liability under
this section, an employee who commits fraud in the course of his employment can

State hospital patient.
State was immune from liability for wrongful death of patient who voluntarily
entered state hospital since she was "incarcerated" or "confined" within the
meaning of this section? "other place of legal confinement" includes the
hospital. The fact that decedent was voluntary patient did not preclude
conclusion that she was "incarcerated" since she had not sought release and had
she done so, superintendent could obtain court order preventing her release.
Emery v. State, 26 Utah 2d 1, 483 P.2d 1296 (1971).
State's immunity from suit was waived under this section in action alleging
negligent treatment of suicidal patient by psychiatrist and psychologist at
university medical center. Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah 1980).
Trees negligently cut.
City and sidewalk contractor were liable for damage sustained by abutting
homeowner when trees were blown down as result of unnecessary and negligent
cutting of roots. Morris v. Salt Lake City, 35 Utah 474, 101 P. 373 (1909).
Vehicle title certificate.
A lender's complaint against the State Tax Commission, claiming that the
commission and its employees negligently failed to advise the lender that a
duplicate vehicle title had been issued and that it had improperly issued to
the borrower the title certificate upon which the lender relied in making its
loan, was barred by governmental immunity. The issuance of motor vehicle titles
and recordkeeping responsibilities are governmental functions and have immunity
under § 63-30-3. Further, the statutory waiver of immunity for negligence does
not apply, under Subsection (3) of this section, when the alleged injury arises
out of the issuance of a title certificate. Metropolitan Fin. Co. v. State, 714
P.2d 293 (Utah 1986) .
Cited in Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P. 2d 126 (Utah 1987); Maddocks v. Salt
Lake City Corp., 740 P. 2d 1337 (Utah 1987); Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746
P.2d 763 (Utah 1987); Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989);
Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764 (Utah 1991); Bruner v. Rasmussen, 792 F. Supp. 731
(D. Utah 1992); Day v. State, ex rel. Utah Dep't of Pub. Safety, 882 P.2d 1150
(Utah Ct. App. 1994); Rocky Mt. Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp.,
887 P.2d 848 (Utah 1994); Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm' n, 945 P. 2d 125 (Utah
Ct. App. 1997), cert, denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997); Healthcare Servs. Group
v. Utah Dep't of Health, 2002 UT 5, 40 P.3d 591; Pigs Gun Club, Inc. v. Sanpete
County, 2002 UT 17, 42 P.3d 379.
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CHAPTEE IX.
OF THE ACTION FOE CAUSING DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT, NEGLECT
OB DEFAULT.
SECTION.

SECTION .

1216. Company or persons liable for
damages.

1217. Action to be broug'nt by personal
representative.

An Act providing damages for death caused by wrongrf til act, neglect or default.
[Approved FeoruaTii 20.1874..]

(1216.)

SEC.

1. Be it enacted by the Governor and Legis
__

*'

- Company or
T>erson liable

lative Assembly of the Territory of Utah; That whenever the for damans.
death of a person shall be caused by "wrongful act, neglect or
default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if
the death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to
maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof,
then, and in every such case, the person who, or the company or corporation which, would have been liable if death
h^d not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages,
notwithstanding the death of the personanjured, and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount; in law to felony.
(1217.) SEC 2. That every such action shall be brought £rc^°^ttob£e
by, and in the names of the personal representatives of such ^entativeT*
deceased person, and the amount received in every such
action shall be distributed by direction and decree of the
proper probate court, to such persons (other than creditors)
as are by law entitled to distributive shares of the estate of s
such deceased person, and in such proportions as are prescribed by law : Provided, that every such action shall be
commenced within two years after the death of such deceased person : And provided further, that the damages
so recovered shall not in any case exceed the sum of ten
thousand dollars.
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PARTICULAR WRONGS.
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EIGHTH,

PARTICULAR WRONGS.

C H A P T E R I.

DEATH BY NEGLIGENCE.
SECTIOK .

S KCTI o x.

2961 Company or persons liable for 2902 Action to be brought by personal
damages.
representative.

« 2961. ^ 1 6 ) Whenever the death of a person shall be p^J^ ti^Secaused by wronrful act. nesrlect or default, and the act. f o r d a t n a ? e s &

_

'

^

' Feb 20,1874.

t

neglect or default is such as would, if the death had not
ensued, have entitled the partj" injured to maintain an action
and recover damages in respect thereof, then, and in even 7
such case, the person who, or the company or corporation
which would have been liable if death had not ensued, shall
be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death
of the person injured, and although the death shall have been
caused under such circumstances as amount in law to felony.
§ 2962. CI217) That every such action shall be brought Action to be
by, and in the names of the personal representatives of such personal rep/

.

.

.deceased person, and the amount received in every such action
shall be . distributed ,by direction and decree of the proper
probate court, to such persons (other than creditors) as are
by law entitled to distributive shares of the estate of such
deceased person, and in such proportions as are prescribed by
law; Provided, That every such action shall be commenced
within two years after the death of such deceased person;
And provided further, That the damages so recovered shall
not in any case exceed the sum of ten thousand dollars.

resentatives.

ZcL

PARTIES TO C i y i L ACTIONS.

that age, upon the application of a relative or friend of the
infant.
2. "When the infant is defendant, upon the application
of the infant, if he be of the age of fourteen years, and
a p p l r within ten days after the s e m c e of the summons, or if
under that age. or if he neglect so to apply, then upon the
application of a relative or friend of the infant, or of any
other party to the action.
3. When an insane or incompetent person is party to
an action or proceeding, upon the application of a relative or
friend of such insane or incompetent person, or of any other
party to the action or proceeding.
§ 3176. s 231. An unmarried female under twenty U n m a m e d fe .
years of age at the time of her seduction may prosecute, as JSr^erowaBeplaintiff, an action therefor, and may recover therein such
damages, pecuniary or exemplary, as are assessed in her favor.
§ 3177. s 232. A father, or in case of his death or F a t h e i etc>5
desertion of his family, the mother may prosecute as plaintiff ^aucSon°of
for the seduction of the daughter, who at the time of her Qan * nter ' etc seduction is under the age of majority: and the guardian for
the seduction of the ward, who is at the time of her seduction
under the age of majority, though the daughter or the ward
be not living with or in the service of the plaintiff at the time
of the seduction, or afterwards, and there be no loss of
service.
§ 3178. s 233. A father, or in case of his death or W h 0 maT Bne
desertion of his family, the mother may maintain an action^ath^&hSd
for the death or injury of a minor child; and a guardian for
the injury or death of his ward, when such injury or death
is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another. Such
action may be maintained against the person causing the
injury or death, or if such person be employed by another
person who is responsible for his conduct, also against such
other person.
§ 3179. s 234. When the death of a person not being awhenrepre•) \

j_\

r i

J

i

,

*

i ^

sentative may

minor is Gaused by the wrongful act or neglect oi another, sue
his heirs or personal representative^ may maintain an action
for damages against the person causing the death, or if such
person be employed bjT another person who is responsible for
his conduct, then also against such other person. In every J > a m g
action under this and the preceding section, such damages
may be given as under all the circumstances of the case may
be just.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DANIEL GRAPPENDORF, et al,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Date: March 29, 2005

vs.

Case No.: 030404102

CITY OF PLEASANT GROVE, et al.,

Division \TI: Judge James R. Taylor

Defendants.

This matter comes before the court on various motions. A hearing was held on February
28, 2005, where the court heard the motion of Defendant Pleasant Grove City ("Pleasant Grove")
for summary judgment. Several related motions are also outstanding. Before discussing the
merits of the summary judgment motion, it is necessary to clarify the status of the related
motions.
Procedural Posture
Four motions are considered in this decision. First, Pleasant Grove filed its motion for
summary judgment on October 21, 2004. The motion was fully briefed and a decision was
requested on November 16, 2004. Second, the Plamtiffs filed a motion to continue the summary
judgment motion under Rule 56(f). It also was fully briefed, and a decision was requested on
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January 24. 2005. Third, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their opposition to the October
summary judgment motion on January 25, 2005. The Plaintiffs original opposition
memorandum was filed on November 11. 2004, and Plaintiffs seek to supplement that first
memorandum with new argument. Attached to the motion is the proposed supplemental
opposition. This motion has not been fully briefed, and no decision has been requested. Fourth,
Pleasant Grove filed a motion to strike the Plaintiffs' motion to amend on January 26, 2005. This
motion also has not been fully briefed, and no decision has been requested.
The second motion (the motion to postpone) is moot because the court finds that there is
no need for additional discovery for the summary judgment motion. Indeed, as discussed below,
there are no issues of material fact which discover}7 could resolve.
As to the third and~foufth motions (to amendTne opposition, andTo^BfiEe^ie motion to
amend), under ordinary circumstances, the court will not rule on a motion until it has been folly
briefed and a party requests that the court rule on the motion.1 However, in this case, the third
and fourth motions are, in substance, further briefing on the original motion for summary
judgment. The Plaintiffs initially opposed summary judgment by arguing that the statute upon
which Pleasant Grove relies is inapplicable. In the motion to amend, the Plaintiffs argue that the

1

U.R.CP. 7(d).
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statute is unconstitutional under the Utah Constitution.2 The fourth motion contains, among
other things, Pleasant Grove's response to the Plaintiffs' constitutional arguments.
When taken together, the substance of these two motions is further argument for and
against summary judgment for Pleasant Grove. No further briefing on the motion to amend is
required, because Pleasant Grove's motion to strike amounts to a thorough reply to the
constitution arguments raised in the motion to amend. The motion to amend is GRANTED.
Additionally, the motion to strike is DENIED. The filed documents on both these motions will be
treated as supplemental opposition and reply memoranda to Pleasant Grove's motion for
summary judgment.
Pleasant Grove's Motion for Summary Judgment
Consistent with the preceding section, the court now considers Pleasantlafo^'^Dctobef
2004, motion for summary judgment. Initial briefing was completed on November 16, 2004.
Supplemental briefing was made through two additional motions, both brought in January. 2005.
The parties initially requested a decision on the summary7 judgment motion in November, 2004,
and a hearing was held before the court on February 28, 2005. Having fully considered the
memoranda and oral arguments, as well as the applicable law, the court issues this memorandum
decision. Pleasant Grove's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

2

The Plaintiffs characterize their motion to amend as an attempt to "address a misstatement of law in
Defendant's memorandum." Motion to Amend, filed January 25, 2005, p. 1. However, the attached "Supplemental
Memorandum" goes far beyond correcting any characterization of the law that Pleasant Grove has put forward.
Rather, Plaintiffs introduce a novel legal theory to defeat Pleasant Grove's claim for immunity.
Page 3 of 23

Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment"shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party7 is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." U.R.C.P. 56(c). In considering such a motion, "the [undisputed] facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom [are viewed] in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party

" Jackson v. Mateus, 70 P.2d 78, 80 (Utah 2003) (internal citations omitted).
Factual Background
For this motion, the parties do not dispute the facts and circumstances giving rise to this

lawsuit.3 Pleasant Grove is a city in Utah and owns and operates a recreation venue called
^Discovery PartBasebail DiamoM^or'Tvlanila Fiekfc4*" To accommodate baseball and softbat
game play, Pleasant Grove purchased and used a moveable pitching mound. This mound had
been chained to a fence by a Pleasant Grove employee, and, in June of 2002 a forceful wind gust
lifted the mound, causing it to strike Daniel A. Grappendorf who sustained fatal injuries. Other
facts recited in the briefing on this motion are immaterial.4
Pleasant Grove argues that, under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, U.C.A. § 63-30-

" "Plaintiffs do not generally disagree with any of [Pleasant Grove's stated] facts . . . ." Memorandum in
Opposition, filed by Plaintiffs on November 4, 2004, § LA.
4

The Plaintiffs recite extensive facts relative to Pleasant Grove's alleged negligence. See Memorandum in
Opposition § LB. 1—3. For purposes of this motion, the court may assume that Pleasant Grove was negligent.
Pase 4 of 23

1 et seq. (as amended through 2002). it is entitled to immunity from suit arising from its alleged
negligence.5 First. Pleasant Grove acknowledges that ,r[i]ramunit}- from suit... is waived for
injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee" of the government
acting within the scope of employment § 63-30-10 (2002). However, immunity from suits for
negligence is not waived frif the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from: ...(11)
any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands . . . ." § 63-30-10(11) (2002).
Pleasant Grove asserts that the wind gust which lifted the pitching mound and caused it to strike
Daniel Grappendorf is a "natural condition" under the Code, and immunity7 from suit is retained
by the city.
The Plaintiffs reply on two general grounds: (1) the statutory exception to the immunity
wMvef^toesnot^^
Constitution if applied to grant Pleasant Grove immunity and so must not be enforced. The
statutory argument must be considered before the court may reach the constitutional argument.6
Plaintiffs' Statutory Argument
The determination whether a governmental entity is immune from suit entails a three-part

5

The Utah Governmental Immunity Act was repealed in 2004 and replaced by the Governmental
Immunity Act of Utah, U.C.A. § 63-30d-101 et seq. (2004). However, the prior act governs these alleged injuries
because they occurred in 2002.
6

Laney v. Parmew City, 2002 UT 79 H 7, 57 P.3d 1007. 1011 ("the courts should pass upon the
constitutionality of a statute only when such a detenrjination is essential to the decision in a case") (quoting Hoyle v.
Monson, 606 P.2d 240. 242 (Utah 1980)). Here, if Pleasant Grove is not entitled to rrnmuriity under the statute,
there will be no need to consider the constitutionality of the statute.
Paee 5 of 23

analysis: (1) Is the activity a "governmental function1' covered by the general grant of immunity
under § 63-30-3? (2) If so. does the immunity7 act waive immunity' as to the activity in question?
(3) If liability7 has been waived, does the immunity7 act except the activity in question from the
waiver of immunity?7
Governmental function. LLC A. § 63-30-3 (2002) contains a general gram of immunity
from suit for all governmental entities "for any injur)' which results from the exercise of a
governmental function . . . ." A city such as Pleasant Grove is a governmental entity for
purposes of the immunity7 act.8 A "governmental function" is "any act failure to act operation,
function, or undertaking of a governmental entity whether or not. . . governmental proprietary, a
core governmental function, unique to government, undertaken m a dual capacity, essential to or
net-e^-en^f-ta^-^^^
enterprise or private persons."5 It is undisputed that Pleasant Grove is a city and that the
maintenance and operation of Manila Field is a "governmental function" under this definition.10
Immunity waiver. U.C.A. § 63-30-10 (2002) contains a general waiver of immunity for

7

Lovendahl v. Jordan School District. 2002 UT 130 % 15, 63 P.3d 705, 709 (Utah 2002) (citing Ledfors v.
Emery County School District 849 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Utah 1993)).
8

U.CA. § 63-30-2(3) & (7).

9

Id § 63-30-2(4)(a).

10

"Pleasant Grove's proposed application of § 63-30-2(4)(a) is consistent with the statutory language . . .
." Addendum 1 to Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend at 6.
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"injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the
scope of employment. . . ." Here, the Plaintiffs allege negligence, and. for purposes of this
motion, the court assumes that Pleasant Grove was negligent Therefore, immunity from suit
would be waived under § 63-30-10.
Exception to immunity waiver. U.C A. §63-30-10(1)—(19) contains various exceptions to
the waiver of immunity for negligence actions. Pleasant Grove relies on § 63-30-10(11) which
retains immunity for governmental activities "aris[ing] out of, in connection with, or resulting]
from: . . . (11) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands . . . ." The Plaintiffs
do not dispute that Manila Field is "publicly owned or controlled land." The) argue, however.
that the natural condition exception does not apply.
B3aitoa=&a^^

frrRiackner

an avalanche blocked a portion of a public road in Little Cottonwood Canyon. While city and
state employees worked to clear the avalanche and to safel}' route traffic during the clearing, an
Alta deputy marshal instructed the plaintiff Mr. Blackner, along with others, to stop their
vehicles. He did so. and then stood orfthe roadside observing the road clearing. A UDOT
avalanche forecaster notified the deputy marshal that he was concerned about the potential for
another avalanche in the area where Mr. Blackner and the other drivers were stopped. Soon, a
second avalanche occurred and Mr. Blackner was injured. Both avalanches originated on
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National Forest Sendee land.11 Mr. Blackner sued various governmental entities, but the trial
court granted summary judgment under U.C.A. § 63-30-10(11), the natural condition exception.12
Mr. Blackner appealed, arguing that the natural condition exception should not apply
because the defendants' negligence was a proximate cause of his injuries. The Utah Supreme
Court rejected this argument because, under the plain language of the immunity act, ,f[t]he
application of the 'natural condition' exception . . , does not hinge on whether the \ . . condition'
in any way 'proximately caused' the plaintiffs injuries/'13 The court farther found that the f'arise
out o f language "requires only that there be some causal nexus between the risk and the
resulting injury."14 The court found that "[t]he first avalanche and the snow pack . . . were
natural conditions" and Mr. Blackner1 s injuries "arose out of the snow pack and the first
^rv^BnTThF^^-Thg-nc >urf fi i i i r r r h l r a ^

Rlactmer

would not have suffered injury" because "were it not for the first avalanche, [the marshal] would
not have stopped [Mr.] Blackner and others" on the road.16 Under these circumstances, Mr.

11

Blackner, 2002 UT 44ffi|2-6; 48 P3d 949, 950-52.

12

Id

13

14113.

14

IdL % 15, citing Taylor v. Ogden City School District 927 P.2d 159, 163 (Utah 1996) (emphasis added).

15

14114-15.

16

14115.
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Blacknefs injuries "arose out of, were in connection with, or resulted from,! a natural condition,
and the exception to immunity applied.1'
The Plaintiffs argue that the present case is distinguishable from Blackner and is, instead,
controlled by the earlier case Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568 (Utah 1996). The}'- argue
that in Blackner. the exception applied because it was a natural occurrence, the second avalanche,
that actually injured Mr. Blackner. Here, they argue, the instrumentality of injury was an
artificial baseball pitching mound which is not "natural1' and is not a "condition." However,
Blackner does not require the court, to consider the physical cause of injury to the Plaintiffs.
Rather, if the injury arose out of circumstances where a natural condition was a "but for" cause,
the statute applies.18 The Blackner decision speaks specifically about the first avalanche and its

was the physical cause of the injur}'.19 In this light, the Plaintiffs' attempt to distinguish Blackner
is unavailing. The proper application of the Blackner analysis in the present case is that but for
the sudden gust of wind, the injury would not have arose. Under Blackner. the particular

Id ff 16-17.
18

Blackner, supra.f 15-17.

19

In paragraphs 14 & 15 of Blackner, the words ''second avalanche" are not used at all; "both avalanches"
are used only once (in describing the snowpack); "either avalanche" are used only once; but the words "first
avalanche" are used four times, including "Blackner's injuries arose out of the snow pack and the first avalanche."
Id. % 15 (emphasis added). The clear focus of the court's inquiry was as to the first avalanche as a but-for cause of
Mr. Blackner's injuries, not as to the physical results of the second avalanche.
Page 9 of 23

instrumentality of the injury appears to be irrelevant if there is a but-for natural condition cause
of the injury.
Further, Nelson v. Salt Lake Citv is inapplicable to this case In 1990. Joseph Nelson and
his mother were in Riverside Park in Salt Lake City. Joseph was left to play in a playground in a
park adjacent to the Jordan River Parkway, which provides open access to the Jordan River A
four foot fence had been erected, but a gate in the fence had been broken and not replaced. Both
Salt Lake City and the State of Utah knew of the missing gate, but neither entity took action to
repair the fence.20 Joseph was injured in the Jordan River. The trial court granted summary
judgment to Salt Lake City and the State under the natural condition exception of the
governmental immunity act.2^ The plaintiffs appealed arguing that the cause of Joseph Nelson's

The Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The court first found that
"governmental entities] ha[ve] no general duty to fence in waterways" such as the Jordan River.
which was the natural condition at issue.22 However, because "the City or State undertook to
provide protection'Tbr park visitors ffonnhFP^kvrayand Jordan River7they"are "obligated to

11

Nelson v. Salt Lake Citv, 919 P.2d 568, 570-71 (Utah 1996).

21

The trial court also granted summary judgment under the discretionary function exception of U.CA §
63-60-10(1). Nelson, 919 P.2d at 575. This provision of the immunity act has not been asserted in the present case.
22

Id. at 573.
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exercise reasonable care in maintaining the fence."23 The government's decision to attempt to
protect park visitors from a particular natural condition (the Jordan River) took the case out of §
63-3040(11).
This is not true m the present case. The assertions in the file demonstrate that the
pitching mounds' placement against the chain link fence was intended as a protective measure.24
However, there is no allegation that the protective effort was undertaken to protect Manila Field
patrons from sudden and unpredictable gusts of wind or from any other natural condition. The
filed documents assert that the pitching mound was chained to keep ,l somebody [from being]
injured while jumping . . . bikes/125 This remedial action, them was not to protect against the
particular natural condition in question as was the case in Nelson. The Nelson case is
"inapplicEble^
Therefore, under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act as in effect in 2002. Defendant

23

Iiat575.

^ 4 See Exhibit 2 to the Memorandum in Opposition.
2:5

Id. The Plaintiffs also allege that the mound was secured to the fence to avoid it being stolen or tipped
over. The court has reviewed Exhibit 2 and does not fmd language to support this assertion. Furthermore. Exhibit 2
is not an affidavit of Paul Scoonover and is replete with inadmissible hearsay. For example, though the exhibit
contains Mr. Scoonovefs "description" of the events at Manila Field when Darnel Grappendorf was fatally injured,
he clearly stated on page 7 that he "wasn't there. I was up in Salt Lake." Id, Obviously, he has no eye-witness,
first-hand knowledge of what transpired in Pleasant Grove while he was Salt Lake This exhibit, filed without
foundation, may not be considered by this court m any event. U.R.C.P. 12 allows the court to consider "pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits. . . . " This and the
Plaintiffs similar exhibits appear to be transcripts of telephone conversanons and are not any of those items listed in
Rule 12.
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Pleasant Grove City is entitled to immunity from suit for negligence in this case because, by
operation of U.C.A. § 63-30-10(11), the city's immunity' for negligence is not waived.
Plaintiffs' Constitutional Argument
The Plaintiffs argue that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act thus applied violates
Article I § 11 and Article XVI § 5 of the Utah Constitution. In particular, the}' argue that the
definition of"governmental function" in § 63-30-2(4)(a), which was enacted in 1987. is
unconstitutionally overbroad. They rely principally on Lanev v. Fairview Citv. 2002 UT 795 57
P.3d 1007.26
In Lanev. a man was electrocuted and killed while moving metal irrigation piping that
either came into contact with or came within arcing distance of power lines ovraed and operated
5y FMrvJewtTit^

brought a wrongful death suit which was dismissed af.

trial under an exception to the waiver of immunity for negligence actions for "discretionary
functions" of the government.27 In applying the Ledfors three-part test2S to determine the
immunity question, the trial court found that Fairview's decision not to improve the power lines
or post warning signs on them was a discretionary governmental function entitled to immunity;

26

The Lanev decision does not address Article XVI § 5. This section is part of the article on "Labor." No
party has cited any cases demonstrating that this section applies in the present action. As such, this decision
addresses only Article I § 11.
27

Lanev supra,. % 4 (citing U.CA. § 63-30-10(1) (1997)).
See note 7, supra.
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that the immunity was waived by statute because the claim was for negligence; but, that the
statutor}* provision previously cited excepted the case from the waiver of immunity'.20 The
Plaintiffs appealed on the ground that the statute violated Article I § 11 of the Utah
Constitution.30 Before deciding the constitutional question, the Utah Supreme Coun engaged in
a lengthy statutor}' analysis.51 The court concluded that Fairview was entitled to immunity under
the statutory framework.32
The court then analyzed the statute itself under .Article I § 1L the so-called "open courts"
clause. That clause reads as follows:
All courts shall be open, and ever}' person, for an injur}7 done to him in his person,
property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law. which shall be
administered without demal or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this state, by himself or counsel any civil
gaixse~to^',hiclrSe is"a"party^"
The coun engages in a lengthy discussion of the history and purpose of the "open conns" clause.
ultimately finding that the clause provides "substantive rights to remedies." and has done so

Lanev. supra % 5 & n. 4.
30

It appears that the Plaintiffs did not argue Article XVI § 5 on appeal Id_ ^" 6.

31

ML Iff 7-26.

32

Id ^26.
Utah Constitution, .Article I § 5: Laney, supra, at % 28.
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"throughout our state's history.'*34 Other constitutional provisions, including .Article XVI § 5,
provide similar substantive rights.35 The court emphasized that Article I § 11 "imposes some
limits on the legislature1' to limit claims brought in state court.36 When "[a] legislative enactment
. . . does not eliminate a remedy[. it] is not unconstitutional under the open courts provision."3"
However, if a statute does abrogate a cause of action, it should be analyzed under the framework
established in Bern' v. Beech .Aircraft Corp.. 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985). which is expressly
confirmed in Lanev.3£ to determine if it contravenes the state constitution.
As a preliminary matter, application of the Lanev decision is challenging for at least four
reasons. First, that decision expressly limited itself: "the 1987 amendment, declaring all acts of
municipalities to be governmental functions, is unconstitutional as applied to municipalities
"(grating"electrical power systems;* "the amendment is arbitrary and unreasonable when applied.
to the operation of a municipal power system, where a high duty of care is imposed:" "we
express no opinion on the constitutionality of the amendment as applied to other municipal

* Laney. supra, atffij30-33.
35

Id at U 34.

36

I±atffi30, 37. See also ^T 41-42, discussing Brown v. Wighrmaiu 151 P. 366 fUtah 19151

J/

Laney, supra at % 49 (citing Utah Constitution Article I § 11).

* "This court. . . continue[s] to apply the Berry analysis with absolute!}' no reservations . . .
supra, at \ 44.
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" Laney,

activities
Second, the Lanev lead opinion's analysis is joined only by two justices and thus
represents a plurality analysis.40 The other concurring justices endorsed a different analysis not
argued here.
Third, the immunity sought to be retained in Laney was urged based on an exception to
immunity quite different from the one presently before the court, and it is not clear how this court
must proceed when, as here, "a lower standard of care may apply and different considerations
may be relevant."41 Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court suggested in Laney that, notwithstanding

Lanev. supra at ^ 1 & 71 (emphasis added). Further, the Utah Supreme Court prefaced its analysis
with a reference to Brigham v. Moon Lake Electric Association. 470 P.2d 393 (1970) and its clear statement that
"[a] high tension transmission wire is one of the most dangerous things known to man." Id. at *\ 64. The concurring
opinion echoesjhis hrninng language. See id. at ^ 81 -83.
40

Id, at TIT 73-74. 83-84. Chief Justice Durham authored the lead opinion which contains the
complicated analysis urged by the Plaintiffs here, and Justice Howe joined in that opinion. Justice Russon concurs
in the result but on differing analytical grounds, and Justice Wilkins joined that concurrence. Justices Wilkins and
Associate Chief Justice Durrani also dissented at great length. See id, at ^ 84-139. Justice Russon's concurrence
opposes the lead opinion's conclusion that the legislature can abrogate an existing cause of action if it meets the
Berry test. Id. at % 74.
4i

Id..at ^J2,__Exceptions .to the .waiver of immunity for negligence are myriad, but the one before the
court in this case is unique among them. The other exceptions deal primarily with the particular class or type of
activity the government is engaged in. to wit (1) a ,(discretionary function"; (2) intentional torts and other specific
torts; (3) actions related to state licenses, certificates and the like; (4) actions related to inspections; (5) rnstitunng
and prosecuting judicial and other proceedings; (6) misrepresentations; (7) government actions related to nots and
other unlawful activities; (8) actions related to the collection of taxes; (10) actions related to incarcerations; (11) (in
part) actions related to mines or mining operations; (12) actions related to cloud management; (13; actions relative
to management of flood waters and other natural disasters); and so on. U.C.A. § 63-30-10(1 >—(19). But the '''natural
condition" exception of subsection (10) is quite different. It does not purport to retain immunity for any particular
class or type of governmental activities; rather, it appears to retain immunity for any negligent government activity7.
whether or not listed in other exceptions, so long as a condition of nature was a but-for cause of the injury suffered.
That is, the kind or type of activity appears to be irrelevant for purposes of subsection (11). This differs from
Lanev. where retention of immunity was sought under subsection (1) for discretionary functions, which are a
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the statute- and precedent-based definitions of "governmental function" under consideration, the
degree of risk involved in a particular governmental activit} may be a relevant factor.42
Fourth, while the Utah Supreme Court has noted possible latent constitutional problems
with the immunity statute.43 decisions subsequent to Lane\ may mdicate that the court does not
intend Lane\ to have the sweeping effect the Plaintiffs ask for here M
Elimination of a Remedy Prior to the 1987 enactment of the definition in § 63-302(4)fa). ,r[o]nly those activities determined to be governmental functions were afforded
immunity;" those that were considered "proprietary functions" were not/' In Standiford v Salt
Lake Citv Corp.. the Utah Supreme Court held that a governmental function is one "of such a

particular kind of acnvity See also the hste of enumerated exceptions ID Lovendahl ^ Jordan School District, 2002

TrrnoT^Ti.r42

"We express no opinion on the constitutionahty of the amendment as applied to other municipal
activities smce a lower standard of care ma> apply " Id, at ^ 71 This and other Lane\ language suggests that the
"vastly greater' potential for injury resulting from uninsulated power hues than in "the operation of
a sewer
system and a golf course" ma> have been an important consideration in Lanev Id, at ^ 69 So. in decidmg the
constitutionality of the statutory definition of government funcnon. the court may have at least partial!} considered
the duty7 attendant to a particular municipal activity. Hov\ this is relevant in deterrmnmg if aD acnvity is "of such a
unique nature that it can only be performed by a governmental agency or that it is essential to the core of
~governmentol~activity"-;;-:me definition~of a "governmental function" from 1980 through the time of the 1987
amendment here in question—-is not clear Id, at ^1 51 (quoting Standiford v Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230,
1236-37 (Utah 1980)).
43

See e ^ Hansen v Salt Lake Cm. 794 P.2d 838. 845 (Utah 1965)

44

In Lovendahl v Jordan School District 2002 UT 130. 63 P.3d 705. decided five months after Lane\.
the court did not address the constitutionahty of the rrrrmunity statute's definition of "governmental function" Even
though it appears that the appellant did not raise a constitutional argument, the court did not apply Laney This may
suggest a cautious approach to invalidating sections of the iirimunity act
45

IdatT51.
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unique nature that it can onh be performed by a governmental agency or

. is essential to the

core of governmental activity-f'46 The court has noted that "it is not possible to define precisely
the scope of governmental immunity doctrine m 1896 [the year the Utah Constitution was
adopted] because of the paucity of cases" and that Standiford "refoeused the legal analysis for
determinmg governmental liability to take into account considerations relevant to the task of
providing necessary protection for essential governmental activities M4~
The Plaintiffs here have not offered any authority• indicating how the Standiford
definition should be applied in determining whether or not a cause action was abrogated by the
legislative enactment.48 Pleasant Grove has likewise cited no authority which ma\ answer this
question49 Particularly, neither party has offered any authority establishing the status of a city's

Standiford. supra at 1236-3 n The court openh acknowledged that in embracing this definition it was
"redefining 'governmental function'" and that this is a ?ne\* standard [which would" broadenP governmental
liability " It found mat this approach was ' consistent with the plain legislative mtent in [then then-effective] § 6330-1 et seq to expand governmental habilm " Id, This presents yet another challenge in applying Lane> and Berry
if the legislature abrogates an existing cause of action, tins ma\ contravene Article I § 11 But if such a cause of
action only exists because it was created by the judiciary's adoption of a nevv standard it is not obvious that the
legislature has abrogated an otherwise constitutional!} protected cause of action See Lanev supra at % 42 ("the
court recogmze[s] that the open courts clause does not give the court the power to create new legal rights")
47

DeBrvv Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 440 (Utah 1995)

48

See Addendum 1 to Motion to .Amend Opposition to Siirnmary Judgment, pp 5-7 The Plaintiffs'
memorandum argues against summar} judgment based on Lanev and Article XVI § 5 The} correctly point out that
the Berry test applies when a constitutionally protected cause of action is abrogated by legislative enactment.
however, here, the court first must determme if a cause of action in negligence against a mumcipahty existed pnor
to the 1987 amendment to the immunity act The Plaintiffs' memorandum assumes this pomt of the analysis but
this court cannot do so
49

Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend pp 6-9 Pleasant Grove states that "operation and
maintenance of a public park and baseball diamond" were "not proprietary m nature" and so were "go\ emmental
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operation of a public park a "governmental function" or otherwise Thus, this court must proceed
on its own review of the relevant law.
Application of the Standiford Definition. In applying Standiford to governmental
immunity cases, the scope of immunity determined by the legislature "must, of course, be
accorded a presumption of constitutionality.'00 Also, there is an appropriate "degree of
flexibility" in applying the Standiford definition.51 For example, the rigid argument that any
function that "can be and sometimes is offered by private organizations" is non-governmental,
has been rejected by the Utah Supreme Court.*2 Whether or not pnvate persons or entities may
be able to perform the same function or offer the same sendee is "on!}' one factor to be
considered in determining whether that function is a governmental function and therefore
-immune,"*3
In examining whether or not the operation of a city park is a "governmental function", the
court has found no post-Standiford cases on point. However, there are historic cases which

functions" even under Standiford. However, there is no citation to authority for this proposition. Id at 8
50

DeBrv, supra, at 440.

51

!i

52

Lyon v. Burton. 2000 UT 19 % 40; 5 P.3d 616, 627-28 (analyzing fire fighting).

Id. Also, "[t]he more an activity is revenue producing and especially profit making, the more likely this
factor weighs in favor of its being nongovernmental" Id. at n 10.
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address pubhc parks and similar facilities.5"1 Under the case law prior to both Standiford and the
1987 amendment to the immunity act, operation of a municipal park has been held to be a
governmental function. In Husband v. Salt Lake Citv (1937). the court affirmed a previous
holding that "in the establishment, maintenance, and care of its parks, a city acts in its
governmental capacity7 and is not liable for the negligence of its employees or agents in
connection therewith."55 The court further held that "maintenance and care of the park" then at
issue was a governmental function, and that cases holding to the contrary were "contrary to the
weight of authority."56

In Ramirez v. Qgden Citv (1955). the court held that a public recreation

facility that was a general benefit to the community without being a profit-making enterprise was
immune from suit.5"
Other cases are less clear. For example, in Griffin v. Salt Lake Citv (1947). the Utah
Supreme Court held that factors indicating operation of a public swimming pool as a "business
enterprise", such as "an admission charge [and] a collection of taxes on admission", made that

' Interestingly, when the Utah Supreme Court needed to deterrrhne if a cause of action existed prior to
1987. that court did not reply on post-Standiford cases, but instead looked to historical cases addressing the issue
such as Lehi City v. Meiling 48 P.2d 530 (Utah 1935) and Egelhoffv. Qgden Citv. 267 P. 1011 (Utah 1928).
55

Husband, 69 P.2d 491, 494 (Utah 1937) (citing numerous cases including Sehv v. Salt Lake City, 41
Utah 535. and Alder v. Salt Lake Citv, 64 Utah 568 (erecting a grandstand in a public park was a government
function qualifying for irnmunity from suit)).
56

Husband, supra, at 494-95 & 461.

~ Ramirez, supra, at 466.
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activity a proprietary function.58 However, the court suggested that in the "case of a swimming
pool operated without charge in connection with some park," immunity may have been
retained."9
Other jurisdictions had reached conflicting results at the time Standiford was adopted.60
Thus, it appears that historically, maintenance and operation of a city park in Utah was at best a
governmental function, at worst a mixed question.
Absent controlling authority, this court cannot say that operation of a public park is a
non-governmental function. Though in Standiford the court found that "operation of a public
golf course" is not a governmental function,61 this does not fully answer the question as Plaintiffs
have suggested. For example, is the construction of any public gathering place a governmental
function? What about a public park with facilities dedicated to public debate and discussion9
What about state or national parks? How important, if at all, is the particular purpose of such
facilities? For example, should a public park with sports facilities be treated differently than one
with only open fields? In his Lanev concurrence, Justice Russon highlights the difficulties in

58

Griffin 176 P.2d 156, 160 (Utah 1947).

59

Id. at 159-60 (the swimming pool "may be adjacent to a public park, but it is not operated as part of
such adjacent park"; "[tjhis is not the case of a swimming pool operated without charge in connection with some
park"; "[m]ost of the cases cited where the municipality was held to be immune . . . are . . . cases where no
admission fee . . . is charged or the fees charged are . . . nominal....").
60

Standiford, supra at 1233-34.

61

Id. at 1237.
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appl}dng the Siandiford test. He calls "-proprietary functions" those "normal!}' performed by
private persons or businesses. M6: Here, the parties have not offered any argument as 10 what is
"normally" done by private entities.
The Utah caseiaw (or lack thereof) briefed and argued before this court provides no clear
analysis or demarcation for the court to follow. In such a circumstance, the presumption of
constitutionality afforded to legislative enactments and the "degree of flexibility'" which attends
the Stantiford definition weigh against a finding that the immunity act is unconstitutional!}7
overbroad. The above-cited limiting language of the Lanev decision further weighs against such
a finding.
Therefore, this court cannot find that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act as amended
in 1987 unconstitutionally abrogated a pre-existing and constitutionally protected cause of action
for negligence against a municipality or its employee in the operation or maintenance of a public
park. Because there is no finding that the legislamre impermissibh' abrogated a cause of action,
this court will not apply the Bern' test as directed by Lanev: the immunity statute must be
applied as presently in effect. As discussed above, Pleasant Grove City is immune from suit
under the statute.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the motion of Defendant Pleasant Grove City for

Laney, supra at % 76 (Justice Russon. concurring).
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summary judgement under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (as in effect in 2002) is
GRANTED.

Pleasant Grove is ordered to submit an order in accordance with this decision and in

compliance with U.R. C J?. 7(f).

A certificate of mailing is on the following page
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM DECISION

DANIEL GRAPPENDORF, et al,
Plaintiffs,

Date: May 17, 2005
vs.
Case No.: 030404102
7

CITl OF PLEASANT GROVE, et al.,
Division VTI: Judge James R. Taylor
Defendants.

This matter came before the court on various motions and a memorandum decision was
issued on March 29, 2005 which, in part, granted Pleasant Grove's motion for summary
judgment. On April 6, 2005, the Plaintiffs filed an objection the Pleasant Grove's proposed order
on the March 29 decision. The court now issues this supplemental memorandum decision to
augment the March 29 decision.
Background
In its decision of March 29, 2005, this court found that Pleasant Grove is immune from
suit by the Plaintiffs under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act as in effect in 2002. Pleasant
Grove had argued that the claim for negligence was barred by the Act's "natural condition"
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m69

exception1, and that a similar exception for "infliction of mental anguish"2 barred the Plaintiffs'
claim for relief for emotional distress. The court found that the natural condition exception did
apply and Pleasant Grove was immune from suit for negligence under that provision.
Further, in other motions that the court construed as further briefing on Pleasant Grove's
summary judgment motion, the Plaintiffs advanced constitutional arguments in opposition to
Pleasant Grove's claim for immunity. These arguments questioned the constitutionality of the
Act's definition of "governmental function."3 The court found that the controlling authority did
not invalidate this definition as applied to the facts of this case and granted Pleasant Grove's
motion for summary judgment.
The Plaintiffs object to Pleasant Grove's proposed order on two bases: that the order
dismisses the Plaintiffs' claim for emotional distress which was not addressed by the prior
decision of the court; and, that the order dismisses the complaint with prejudice which is
inappropriate in this case. Each basis will be discussed in turn.
Emotional Distress
The Plaintiffs emotional distress claims are barred by the Immunity Act. The
determination whether a governmental entity is immune from suit entails a three-part analysis:

1

U.C.A. § 63-30-10(11) (as amended through 2002).

2

U.C.A. § 63-30-10(2) (as amended through 2002).

3

U.C.A. § 63-30-2(4)(a) (as amended through 2002).
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(1) Is the activity a "governmental function'' covered by the general grant of immunity under §
63-30-3? (2) If so, does the immunity act waive immunity as to the activity in question? (3) If
liability has been waived, does the immunity act except the activity in question from the waiver
of immunity?4
The analysis of the first two questions is fully addressed by the prior decision of the
court. See the Memorandum Decision in this case issued March 29, 2005, pp. 6-7. In short,
Pleasant Grove's operation and maintenance of Manila Field is a governmental function within
the meaning of the Act, and the Act specifically waives immunity from suit for the negligence of
Pleasant Grove.
The Act contains various exceptions to the waiver of immunity for negligence actions.
For purposes of the Plaintiffs' claim of emotional distress, Pleasant Grove relies on U.CA. § 6330-10(2), which retains immunity from suit for "injury proximately caused by . . . negligen[ce]
. , . if the injur>r arises out of, in connection with, or results from: . . . infliction of mental
anguish . . . ,f° Thus, the statutory language specifically retains immunity for negligence-based
claims for emotional distress.
This plain-language reading of the statute is consistent with the view expressed by the

4

Lovendahl v. Jordan School District 2002 UT 130 115, 63 P.3d 705, 709 (Utah 2002) (citing Ledfors v.
Emery County School District 849 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Utah 1993)).
5

U.CA. § 63-30-10 & -10(2) (as amended through 2002).
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Utah Court of Appeals. In "ascertaining] whether . . . immunity has been expressly waived for
. . . alleged . . . emotional distress" the Court of Appeals noted that "section 63-30-10 [contains]
an explicit exception to the waiver provided for by that section for injuries arising out of
'infliction of mental anguish. ",6
The case cited by both the Plaintiffs and Pleasant Grove in briefing on the original
motion, Gabriel v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 2001 UT App. 277, 34 P.3d 234 (Utah App. 2001) is
inapposite.7 In that case, the trial court granted summary judgment to Salt Lake City in a
negligence case without issuing an explanatory- decision. The claims in that case included
general negligence, as well as mental distress claims. The Court of Appeals reversed the grant of
summary judgment because, though the Immunity Act does retain immunity from suit for claims
related-to-mentaLanguish-under § 63-30-10(2), the Plaintiffs other negligence claims could not
have been dismissed under that provision.8 Here, the Plaintiffs are correct in noting that they
have "plead negligent infliction of emotional harm, [for] which [immunity] is waived because the
emotional distress constitutes damages caused by a negligent act."9 However, § 63-30-10(2)

6

Ativa v. Salt Lke County. 852 P.2d 1007, 1011 & n.6 (Utah App. 1993).

7

All parties mis-cited this case. Pleasant Grove cited it as '7001 UT 277"; the Plaintiffs cited it as "2004
UT App. 59", which is a later appeal on the case on issues unrelated to mental anguish.
8

Gabnel v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2001 UT App 277 HI 11-12.

Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendant Pleasant Grove's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed
November 4, 2004, p. 19.
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specifically excepts damages for "mental anguish" from the general waiver. Nothing in Gabriel
suggests a contrary result.
Therefore, under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, U.C A. § 63-30-1 et seq.9 as in
effect in 2002, Pleasant Grove is immune from suit by the Plaintiffs' for their claims for
emotional distress.
The Plaintiffs' later constitutional arguments do not address mental distress or anguish.
The substance of the Plaintiffs "Supplemental Memorandum re: the Constitutionality of § 6330-2(4)(a) after Lanev v. Fairview City" deals solely with the Plaintiffs' wrongful death claim
which has been fully treated by this court's March 29, 2005 decision.
Dismissal with Prejudice
Consistent with this-court's present and prior decisions, Pleasant Grove is wholly immune
from suit under the causes of action alleged by the Plaintiffs. Therefore, it is appropriate that the
dismissal be with prejudice on these claims.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Pleasant Grove's motion for summary judgement as to the
Plaintiffs claims for emotional distress is GRANTED. All claims adjudicated in favor of Pleasant
Grove by this decision and the court's decision of March 29, 2005, shall be dismissed with
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prejudice. The order submitted by counsel for Pleasant Grove comphes with this court's
decisions in all material respects and will be executed by this court forthwith.
Dated this D

day of t ^ A c ^ .

JUidge

, 20£5r

.James R. Ta||&j
Fourth Judicial Drs'

A certificate of mailing is on the following page.
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FILED
FonrvK .;:HMf:>a! District Court
oi v »•;£:•; Gountv, State of Utah
Deputy

Attorneys for Defendant City of Pleasant Grove

IN THE COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DANIEL GRAPPENDORF and HEIDI
GRAPPENDORF, individually and as
parents and heirs of DANIEL AUSTIN
GRAPPENDORF (deceased), PHIL
THOMPSON and JENNY THOMPSON,

ORDER GRANTING CITY OF
PLEASANT GROVE'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
:

Plaintiffs,
:

Civil No: 030404102
Judge James R. Taylor

v.

CITY OF PLEASANT GROVE and
AMERICAN SPORTS
INTERNATIONAL, LTD. a/k/a
AMERICAN ATHLETICS, INC., an Iowa
Corporation, BECWILL CORP., d/b/a
PROPER PITCH, a North Carolina
Corporation, PROPER PITCH, and Does
I-X.
Defendants.

:
:
:
:

This matter came on for hearing on February 28, 2005, pursuant to (1) Pleasant
Grove City's Motion for Summary Judgment, (2) Plaintiffs' Motion for Continuance of Pleasant
Grove's Summary Judgment Motion, (3) Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Their Response in

Opposition to Defendant Pleasant Grove's Motion for Summary Judgment, and (4) Pleasant
Grove City's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Their Response in Opposition to
Defendant Pleasant Grove City's Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs were represented by
their attorney, Ryan M. Springer. Defendant Pleasant Grove City was represented by its attorney,
Peter Stirba. The Court, having read the parties' memoranda, factual submissions, case law
presented in support and opposition to the Motions, and having heard the arguments of counsel,
and for the reasons stated in its March 29, 2005 Memorandum Decision, hereby ORDERS as
follows:
1.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Continuance of Pleasant Grove's Summary Judgment

Motion is MOOT because there is no need for additional discovery for the summary judgment
motion;
2.

Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Their Response in Opposition to Defendant Pleasant

Grove's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED;
3.

Pleasant Grove City's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend Their

Response in Opposition to Defendant Pleasant Grove City's Motion for Summary Judgment is
DENIED;
4.

Pleasant Grove City's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and

plaintiffs' claims against this defendant are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.
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